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Introduction
In the course of the global financial crisis, countries that did not experience a
sovereign debt crisis for several decades suddenly faced increasing sovereign default
risk spreads as investors started to doubt the sustainability of fiscal positions. Several
European countries struggled to avoid a government default and Greece defaulted in
2012. The three chapters of this thesis analyze several important questions related to
sovereign borrowing and sovereign default risk that have received much attention in
the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis. Chapter 1 builds on the observation
that twin deficits, that is the simultaneous deficit of the fiscal balance and the current
account, occurred in several European countries in the years before and during
the global financial crisis. These observations revived the debate about whether
increasing fiscal deficits cause larger current account imbalances. The first chapter
analyzes, both empirically and theoretically, how the occurrence of twin deficits
depends on the indebtedness of the government. Chapter 2 relates to the European
sovereign debt crisis during which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) together
with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its predecessors provided financial
assistance to countries facing financial distress. The second chapter investigates within
a quantitative model of sovereign default how the provision of financial assistance by
a supranational agency affects the probability of a government default. Chapter 3
analyzes the impact of pegging a country’s currency on sovereign default incentives.
Following the announcement of the introduction of the Euro sovereign risk spreads
decreased in several European countries. Lower spreads might have favored sovereign
debt accumulation in the following years. The third chapter employs a quantitative
model of sovereign default to study how pegging the currency, and thereby reducing
1
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the flexibility when faced with sovereign debt crises, affects sovereign debt levels
and the default probability of the government. The remainder of this introduction
provides more details about the three chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter 1. The first chapter is based on joint work with Patrick Hürtgen. The
chapter examines whether the co-movement of the fiscal balance and the current
account depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio. The possible consequences
of rising public debt stocks in many European countries have received much attention
in the recent policy debate. In the euro zone the average government debt-to-GDP
ratio increased from 70 percent in 2008 to 90 percent in 2012. Before and at the
beginning of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 several southern European countries
experienced increasing fiscal deficits and widening current account imbalances. These
observations have rekindled the issue of possible causal linkages between the fiscal
balance and the current account — a debate that has received much attention since
the observation of twin deficits in the U.S. economy in the 1980s. Since 2008-09,
despite protracted fiscal deficits, the current accounts of southern European countries
have been rebalancing sharply, suggesting that the link between the twin deficits has
diminished.
In the first part of the analysis in Chapter 1 a dynamic panel threshold model for
15 European countries is estimated to quantify the influence of sovereign indebtedness
on the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account. The employed
method allows for the estimation of a threshold value of sovereign debt at which
the co-movement of the two balances changes. Below the estimated threshold of 72
percent government debt-to-GDP a significant, positive relationship between the fiscal
balance and the current account is found, whereas above the threshold the partial
correlation is insignificant with a point estimate around zero. Splitting the sample
into observations below and above the estimated threshold shows that the correlation
of the two balances falls by 0.19 when moving from the low government debt regime
to the high government debt regime. The second part of the analysis provides a
structural explanation for the empirical evidence based on a small open economy
model allowing for the possibility of sovereign default. High government debt-to-GDP
ratios raise non-linear sovereign default risk premia due to the increasing probability
of government default and lead to higher expected labor tax rates. In the case of a
sovereign default, however, a haircut lowers the government debt-to-GDP ratio and
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expected labor tax rates fall. Households are therefore faced with a higher uncertainty
about future taxes at high government debt-to-GDP ratios. Optimizing households
increase their saving while fiscal deficits are expanding, leading to less pronounced
current account deficits. The model-based correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account declines by 0.15 when moving from a low government debt regime to
a high government debt regime, in line with the empirical evidence.
Chapter 2. The second chapter builds on joint work with Florian Kirsch (Kirsch
and Rühmkorf, 2013). While there is a long history of sovereign debt crises and
financial assistance in emerging economies, the policy debate about the impact of
financial assistance has attracted increasing attention in the course of the European
sovereign debt crisis. This chapter analyzes the impact of the provision of financial
assistance by official lenders like the IMF on the debt level and the default probability
of borrowing governments.
The provision of financial assistance might help to avoid a default by the government
in two different ways. First, a default of the government can be triggered by a run
by investors on the market for government debt. Runs on sovereign debt markets
constitute a major threat for indebted governments as they can push countries into
default that have in principle sound fundamentals and would not default otherwise.
An official lending facility can help to prevent the possible coordination failure as
financial assistance supplies the government with funds even in the case of a run by
private investors. Second, a government might default because of bad fundamentals
like low output and high debt levels. Sovereign spreads rise as investors demand a
compensation for the default risk which increases refinancing costs of the government.
In this case the provision of financial assistance can help to bridge crisis periods by
lowering refinancing costs of the government and avoid a default in this way. In both
cases, the provision of financial assistance lowers the default probability for a given
level of government debt. In equilibrium, the smaller default probability translates
into lower sovereign risk spreads for given levels of government debt. The lower
borrowing costs might, however, induce the government to accumulate higher debt
levels and thus increase default incentives.
To assess the overall effect of the availability of financial assistance on the probability
of default the second chapter considers a quantitative model of endogenous credit
3
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structure and sovereign default that allows for both defaults due to self-fulfilling
expectations and defaults due to bad fundamentals. The model features an official
lending facility that captures the main characteristics of actual international financial
institutions. For the quantitative analysis the model is calibrated to Argentinean data.
Comparing the benchmark model to a version of the model in which the government
does not have access to financial assistance reveals that the availability of financial
assistance reduces the number of defaults that occur due to self-fulfilling runs by
private investors. However, at the same time it raises average debt levels and causes
an overall increase of the probability of default.
Chapter 3. The third chapter studies how the option to devalue the currency to
reduce the debt burden affects the average debt level and the default incentives of
the government. While some governments borrow from foreign investors in foreign
currency, many governments borrow from foreign investors primarily in domestic
currency. Borrowing in domestic currency provides the government with the option
to partially default on its debt by devaluing its currency. However, a devaluation is
costly as it typically triggers a temporary deterioration of the terms of trade. The
option to devalue gives the government a higher degree of flexibility and might reduce
the frequency of outright defaults. In contrast, pegging the exchange rate to a foreign
currency (for example by establishing a currency board), dollarizing the economy
or borrowing in foreign currency deprives the government of the option to devalue
its currency to reduce the real debt burden and might therefore increase the default
probability.
To analyze the impact of the option to devalue on average debt levels and the default
probability a quantitative model of sovereign default and devaluation is considered.
The model is calibrated to Argentinean data from the time before the establishment of
the currency board in 1991. The benchmark model is compared with a model version
in which the option to devalue is eliminated. Simulations of the two models show
that average debt is higher when the government cannot devalue. The elimination
of devaluation risk leads to lower sovereign spreads at low government debt levels.
Lower sovereign spreads induce the government to accumulate larger amounts of debt.
The probability of a sovereign default and the average spread increase. This is due
to both higher average debt levels and a lower flexibility when facing sovereign debt
crisis as the option to devalue to lower the value of the debt burden is not existent
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anymore.
The findings of the third chapter are in line with the experience of several southern
European countries that adopted the Euro: Around the time that the introduction
of the Euro was accounced spreads started to fall, while sovereign spreads increased
again during the financial crisis, presumably due to higher default risk. The results
of this chapter also shed light on the debate about the ‘original sin’. When the
government has the option to devalue its debt, sovereign spreads for given debt levels
are higher due to the devaluation risk. The higher borrowing costs endogenously
reduce government debt levels. The government therefore borrows on average less
from international investors when the debt is denominated in domestic currency than
when the debt is denominated in foreign currency.
5

Chapter1
Sovereign Default Risk and
State-Dependent Twin Deficits
1.1 Introduction
The notion of ‘twin deficits’ is based on the observation that the fiscal deficit and
the current account deficit increased in tandem during the 1980s in the U.S. economy.
In several European countries twin deficits also occurred in the years before and during
the global financial crisis, reviving the debate about whether increasing fiscal deficits
cause larger current account imbalances. In particular southern European countries
have experienced large increases in current account imbalances and widening fiscal
deficits. Since 2008-09 current accounts in these countries are rebalancing despite
protracted fiscal deficits, suggesting that the link between the twin deficits diminished.
Fiscal deficits were partially the result of large fiscal stimulus packages that were
intended to foster economic growth. These large fiscal deficits increased public debt
stocks and brought several European governments to the brink of default. Greece
defaulted in 2012. In light of the European sovereign debt crisis, we examine whether
public indebtedness affects the co-movement of the fiscal balance and the current
account. First, we provide empirical evidence showing that the co-movement of the
two balances depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, we examine
whether a small open economy model with the possibility of sovereign default can
explain our empirical evidence.
In the first part of the analysis we estimate the government debt-to-GDP threshold
to separate our sample into a low and a high debt regime. For that purpose we
estimate a dynamic panel threshold model for 15 European countries to quantify the
influence of sovereign indebtedness on the relationship between the fiscal balance
7
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and the current account.1 One advantage of the dynamic panel estimation procedure
is that we estimate the threshold rather than exogenously imposing it. Based on
our estimation strategy we find that the government debt-to-GDP threshold is 72
percent. Splitting our sample into observations below and above the estimated
threshold, we find that the correlation of the two balances falls by 0.19 when moving
from the low government debt regime to the high government debt regime. In the
second part of our analysis we provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical
evidence. We allow for the possibility of sovereign default in a non-linear small
open economy model. High government debt-to-GDP ratios lead to increasing risk
premia as observed in troubled European countries. Facing higher uncertainty about
future taxes, households increase saving rather than accumulate debt to smooth
consumption during an economic downturn. Private saving increases while fiscal
deficits are expanding, leading to a less pronounced current account deficit. The
model-based correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account declines by 0.15
when moving from a low government debt regime to a high government debt regime,
which is in line with our empirical evidence.
From a theoretical point of view the relationship between the fiscal balance and
the current account is ambiguous. The national income accounting identity states
that the current account equals the flow of national savings of the private and the
public sector net of investment. A fiscal deficit (i.e. negative public saving) leads,
ceteris paribus, to a lower current account. Therefore the accounting identity implies
a perfect, positive correlation of the twin deficits. However, given fixed investment,
the endogenous private saving decision also affects the current account and thus the
relationship between the twin deficits. Households internalize the government budget
constraint and increase private saving as they expect that higher government debt
leads to higher future taxes – a point emphasized by proponents of the Ricardian
equivalence. If household saving increases sufficiently, it is possible that the current
account remains unaffected implying no co-movement of fiscal deficits and current
account deficits.
1Our baseline empirical specification follows Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) who estimate a dynamic
threshold model employing non-dynamic panel techniques based on Hansen (1999). We apply the
recently developed methodology of Kremer, Bick, and Nautz (2013) that allows for the estimation
of a dynamic panel threshold model, correcting for the potential bias from using an endogenous
regressor.
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In our theoretical model we try to account for a key feature of the recent Euro-
pean debt crisis, which is the possibility of sovereign default. We assume that the
government borrows from international investors and partially defaults when the
amount of government debt exceeds the fiscal limit. Following Bi (2012) the fiscal
limit is the maximum debt repayment capacity of the government, i.e. the present
discounted value of all possible future fiscal surpluses. International investors demand
non-linear sovereign default risk premia when public debt approaches unsustainable
levels. Labor taxes increase with the public debt stock. Optimizing households
receive transfers from the government and they consume, work and trade assets on
international financial markets.
The model is calibrated to match data for Greece, which is one of the countries
that experienced large external imbalances and high sovereign spreads in recent years.
A negative productivity shock at low government debt-to-GDP ratios leads to an
increase in taxes and the fiscal balance temporarily moves into deficit. Households
increase borrowing to smooth consumption. This implies a strong, positive correlation
between the fiscal balance and the current account. A negative productivity shock
at high government debt levels affects households via expected labor taxes: First,
emerging sovereign risk premia destabilize the fiscal balance, triggering government
debt accumulation and increasing expected labor taxes. Second, a government default
reduces public debt and expected taxes. As a consequence households expect a larger
dispersion of tax rates as government debt approaches high levels. These effects
induce optimizing households to increase their saving, which partially offsets current
account deficits that result from increasing fiscal deficits. Based on non-linear model
simulations with productivity shocks and transfer spending shocks at a low and at a
high government debt-to-GDP ratio we show that the correlation of the twins changes
by a comparable magnitude as in our empirical analysis.
Current account imbalances and their co-movement with fiscal deficits have received
much attention in the literature. The first intertemporal current account model is
studied in Sachs (1981) and is extended by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Building
on these theoretical foundations, the studies of Glick and Rogoff (1995), Corsetti
and Müller (2008) and Bussière, Fratzscher, and Müller (2010) provide evidence that
productivity shocks are the main driver of current account dynamics. Corsetti and
Müller (2006) show that further important drivers of the co-movement of the twin
9
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deficits are the persistence of government spending and the openness of the economy.
Most empirical studies using panel methods (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Chinn
and Ito, 2007; Gruber and Kamin, 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012) find a
significant positive relationship in the medium-term between the fiscal balance and
the current account.2 This chapter contributes new estimates using the estimation
strategy outlined in Kremer et al. (2013). We find a positive and significant coefficient
for the fiscal balance below the government debt threshold, but above the threshold
the estimate is slightly negative and insignificant. Our estimated threshold of 72
percent is robust to alternative specifications of the empirical model.3
In closed economy frameworks Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) show that the
consumption response of the private sector can depend on the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. In these models a fiscal deficit leads to an increase in consumption at
low debt levels, while a fiscal deficit leads to a decrease in consumption at high debt
levels. In difference to our framework these models do not allow for a government
default.
Increasing government debt-to-GDP ratios have received much attention in the
recent policy debate and the academic literature in the course of the European
sovereign debt crisis. This work provides a theoretical framework that includes key
features of the recent crisis and shows that optimizing households internalize growing
government debt stocks, which leads to state-dependent dynamics.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reports our empirical results.
Section 1.3 outlines our theoretical model, derives the state-dependent fiscal limit
and discusses the non-linear solution method. Section 1.4 presents model simulations
which demonstrate that the co-movement of the twins is state-dependent and Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical evidence
In the first part of our analysis, we provide empirical evidence on the co-movement
of the fiscal balance and the current account and how the relationship of the two
2A notable exception is Kim and Roubini (2008), who find evidence in favor of a ‘twin divergence’
rather than a ‘twin deficit’ for the U.S. based on VAR methods.
3Our estimated threshold is slightly higher than the estimate of Baum et al. (2013), who employ a
threshold model to examine non-linear effects of debt and real GDP growth rates.
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balances changes at different government debt-to-GDP ratios. Building on Nickel and
Vansteenkiste (2008) who estimate a similar dynamic panel threshold model with non-
dynamic panel methods, we apply the methodology of Kremer et al. (2013) to avoid
a possible endogeneity bias. Following this procedure we estimate the government
debt-to-GDP threshold. We show that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account for the low and the high government debt regime are significantly
different from each other.
1.2.1 Estimation strategy
We apply the following dynamic panel threshold model to estimate the relationship
of the fiscal balance and the current account depending on the government debt-to-
GDP ratio:
CAit = µi + χCAi,t−1 (1.2.1)
+ β1FBitI(DebtitGDPit ≤ γ) + β2FBitI(DebtitGDPit > γ) + α′xit + uit,
where the current account (CA) and the fiscal balance (FB) are measured in percent
of GDP.4 The threshold level (γ) splits the threshold variable (the government debt-
to-GDP ratio) into two regimes. The set of control variables is denoted by xit. The
indicator function I(·) indicates the regime defined by the threshold variable qit and
the threshold level γ. The error term uit is independent and identically distributed
with mean zero and finite variance. Following previous literature (e.g. Bussière et al.,
2006) we include the lagged current account as a regressor in the baseline specification.
As in Caner and Hansen (2004), we first estimate a reduced form regression for the
endogenous variable on a set of instruments, in our case higher lags of the dependent
variable. We use the predicted values of the lagged dependent variable ĈAi,t−1 to
replace CAi,t−1. Second, we repeatedly estimate equation (1.2.1) via least squares
for all n threshold candidates to obtain the sum of squared residuals Sn(γ). The
4Following previous literature (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Gruber and Kamin, 2007) we assume
that the fiscal balance is not endogenous to the current account. It seems unlikely that European
policymakers systematically adjust the fiscal balance to changes in the current account.
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estimated threshold is selected as the one that minimizes the sum of squared residuals:
γˆ = argmin
γ
Sn(γ). (1.2.2)
The confidence interval for the estimated threshold level γˆ according to Caner and
Hansen (2004) is given by
Γˆ = {γ : LRn(γ) ≤ C}, (1.2.3)
where C denotes the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood
ratio statistic LRn(γ). Given the estimate of the threshold γˆ, the slope coefficients
of equation (1.2.1) are estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM).
Further details on the estimation strategy can be found in Appendix 1.B.
1.2.2 Estimation results
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 15 European countries from 1980 to 2010.5
Table 1.1 provides the main results of our baseline estimation. The series of threshold
candidates ranges from 29.2 percent to 101.6 percent of government debt-to-GDP.6
The threshold estimate of the government debt-to-GDP ratio is 71.8 percent. This
threshold value splits the sample into 260 observations below and 93 observations
above the threshold. The 95 percent confidence interval of the threshold ranges from
69.4 percent to 75.0 percent.
The estimated coefficients for the fiscal balance differ across the two regimes. The
fiscal balance is positively correlated (0.16) with the current account if government
debt is below the threshold. However, in the high government debt regime, there is
virtually no relationship (-0.04) between the fiscal balance and the current account.
Thus, a one percent increase in the fiscal deficit is associated with a current account
deterioration of 0.16 percent in the low government debt regime, while the same
increase in the fiscal deficit has virtually no influence on the current account in the
high government debt regime.
5Detailed information about the data set is given in Appendix 1.A.
6We follow Hansen (1999) and trim the series of threshold candidates by excluding those that lie in
the highest and in the lowest 5% quantile to avoid that the threshold sorts too few observations in
one of the regimes.
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A number of previous studies (see Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Chinn and Ito, 2007;
Gruber and Kamin, 2007; Bussière, Fratzscher, and Müller, 2010; Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2012) estimate the relationship of the fiscal balance and the current account
without applying a threshold model. These studies find a positive relationship between
these two balances ranging from 0.06 to 0.3. Our fiscal balance estimate for the
low government debt regime is in line with these previous estimates. The estimated
coefficient of the lagged current account is positive (0.59) and highly significant. This
estimate reflects the high persistence of current account dynamics and, thus, the
importance of estimating a dynamic model of the current account.
Table 1.1: Estimation results
Variable Coefficient Std. dev.
Current account (t− 1) 0.59*** (0.16)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) 0.16** (0.07)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > γˆ) -0.04 (0.05)
Terms of trade 0.05*** (0.02)
Openness -0.01 (0.01)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 (0.04)
Output gap (in % of potential GDP) -0.28*** (0.11)
Change of total investment (in % of GDP) -0.14 (0.08)
Labor productivity 0.04 (0.03)
Real effective exchange rate -0.06*** (0.02)
Dependency ratio (% of working-age pop.) 0.16** (0.08)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8
95% confidence region [69.4− 75.0]
Total number of observations 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% splits the sample into 260 observations
below and 93 observations above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal balance are
measured in percent of GDP.
The point estimates of the control variables are consistent with previous studies
and in line with implications of theoretical open economy models. The estimated
threshold of 71.8 percent is robust to a range of alternative specifications of the panel
model. A detailed discussion of the results, several robustness checks and a detailed
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discussion of the related empirical literature can be found in Appendix 1.B.
The estimation yields evidence for significant differences in the regime-dependent
fiscal balance coefficients indicating that the co-movement of the fiscal balance and
the current account is state-dependent. The estimated regime-dependent coefficients
(βi) are partial correlations. In our theoretical analysis (in Section 1.3) we examine the
model-implied correlation of the two balances at a low and at a high government debt
level. The correlation of the twins implied by the model cannot be directly compared
to the estimated partial correlations of the panel threshold model. To allow for a
comparison of the empirical and theoretical results we report the correlation of the
two balances in the data for observations below and above the estimated government
debt-to-GDP threshold (see Table 1.2). For observations below the threshold of 71.8
percent the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account is 0.57, whereas
the correlation is 0.38 for observations above the threshold. Therefore, the difference
amounts to 0.19. The confidence intervals for the correlations in both debt regimes
indicate that these values are significantly different at a 10 percent significance level.
The change in the correlation of the two balances is robust to considering the lower
(69.4%) and the upper (75.0%) bound of the confidence region.
Table 1.2: Regime-dependent correlations of fiscal balance and current account
Threshold: γi corr(FB,CA) < γi corr(FB,CA) > γi ∆ corr(FB,CA)
71.8 0.57 [0.50, 0.64] 0.38 [0.26, 0.49] 0.19
69.4 0.58 [0.51, 0.64] 0.35 [0.25, 0.47] 0.22
75.0 0.56 [0.50, 0.63] 0.33 [0.21, 0.46] 0.22
Notes: The left column states the estimated threshold value γˆ of 71.8 percent and its confidence
bounds of 69.4 and 75.0 percent debt-to-GDP. The second and third column report the
correlations of the fiscal balance (FB) and the current account (CA) below and above the
threshold value. The 90 percent confidence interval of the correlations is reported in brackets.
∆ corr(FB,CA) denotes the difference between the correlation in the low debt regime and the
correlation in the high debt regime.
In the backdrop of the current account identity our empirical findings suggest
that households’ behavior responds differently to fiscal deficits at low government
debt-to-GDP ratios compared to high ratios: The higher the government debt-to-GDP
ratio, the stronger households compensate a fiscal deficit by saving more and thereby
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increasingly offset the effect of a fiscal deficit on the current account. This finding
is robust to considering the correlations as well as the regime-dependent partial
correlation estimates. The behavior of households at high government debt-to-GDP
ratios is consistent with the implications of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. In
the next section we examine the occurrence of twin deficits in a structural model to
provide a theoretical explanation for the observed change in the correlation of the
‘twins’.
1.3 The Model
In our theoretical analysis, we consider a small open economy model with default-
able public debt and private asset holdings that are both held by foreign investors.
Households borrow and lend at a time-invariant world interest rate and face portfolio
adjustment costs. The government raises distortionary labor taxes, pays transfers
to households and invests in unproductive government expenditures. The govern-
ment can default on its outstanding debt. Risk-neutral foreign investors require an
endogenous default risk premium when government debt approaches the ‘effective
fiscal limit’. Following Bi (2012) the effective fiscal limit is a random draw from the
model-implied state-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit. A sovereign default
occurs when the government debt stock exceeds the effective fiscal limit.
1.3.1 Households
Consider an economy populated by an infinite number of identical households that
choose consumption ct, leisure Lt, and debt dHt to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, Lt) , (1.3.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, subject to the budget constraint
ct = Wt (1− τt) (1− Lt) + zt + dHt − (1 + r)dHt−1 −
ψ
2
(
dHt − dH
)2
, (1.3.2)
and a no-Ponzi scheme condition. The budget constraint includes consumption ct,
wage Wt, labor taxes τt, government transfers zt to the households and operations in
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international financial markets. Households trade a riskless bond dHt (positive values
of dHt denote debt) at a constant world interest rate r. Following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003) we assume quadratic portfolio adjustment costs that are weighted by
the parameter ψ > 0, where dH denotes the steady state net foreign asset position of
households. We set the discount factor β equal to one over the gross world interest
rate:
β(1 + r) = 1 . (1.3.3)
We assume Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) preferences
u(c, L) =
(
ct − χ (1−Lt)ωω
)1−σ − 1
1− σ , (1.3.4)
where the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1/(ω − 1) and χ > 0 determines the
relative disutility of labor. The degree of relative risk aversion is measured by σ > 0.
As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) as well as by Mendoza and Yue
(2012), these preferences simplify the supply side of the model and help to explain
international business cycle facts.7 The households’ first-order conditions are
(
ct − χ(1− Lt)
ω
ω
)−σ
= λt (1.3.5)
1− Lt =
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
(1.3.6)
λt
(
1− ψ(dHt − dH)
)
= β(1 + r)Etλt+1 , (1.3.7)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.
1.3.2 Production
The production function of output is linear in labor:
yt = At (1− Lt) . (1.3.8)
7Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences remove the wealth effect, which helps to avoid counterfactual
increases in labor when total factor productivity falls.
16
1.3 The Model
The process of total factor productivity (TFP), At, follows an AR(1) process:
ln
(
At
A
)
= ρA ln
(
At−1
A
)
+ A,t , A,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
, (1.3.9)
where A denotes steady state productivity.
Wages are determined on a competitive labor market. Thus, the wage equals the
marginal product of labor which in our case equals TFP:
Wt = At . (1.3.10)
1.3.3 Government
The government receives tax revenues τtWt (1− Lt) through distortionary labor
taxation and issues new public debt bt at a given price qt. It finances government
spending gt and transfers zt. In addition, the government can default on the fraction
4t of its outstanding debt and pays back the remaining debt from last period
bdt = (1−4t) bt−1. Hence, the government budget constraint is:
τtWt (1− Lt) + btqt = bdt + gt + zt . (1.3.11)
We assume that the tax rate τt adjusts linearly to the public debt stock:
τt − τ = γb
(
bdt − b
)
. (1.3.12)
Government spending is a stationary process that responds systematically to changes
in productivity. The parameter γg measures the elasticity of government spending gt
with respect to productivity:
log
(
gt
g
)
= γg log
(
At
A
)
. (1.3.13)
Transfers follow a Markov switching process with a stationary and a non-stationary
regime as in Davig and Leeper (2011):
zt =
(1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 1µzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 2 , (1.3.14)
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where |ρz| < 1, µ > 1 and z,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
. Transfers follow a stationary path when
SZ,t = 1 and an explosive path when SZ,t = 2, where the regimes, SZ,t, follow a
Markov chain with transition matrix pMS 1− pMS
1− pMS pMS
 . (1.3.15)
With probability pMS government transfers stay in one of the regimes. For example,
in case of a high probability pMS transfers are likely to grow for many periods in
the non-stationary regime leading to government debt accumulation. The process
switches from one regime to the other with probability 1− pMS, such that transfers
are ultimately stabilized (as ρz < 1).
1.3.4 Foreign investors
Domestic households and the domestic government borrow and lend from foreign
investors. Unlike the households, the government can default on a fraction of its
outstanding debt stock. Foreign investors have access to an international credit
market where they can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at a constant world interest
rate r > 0.
Foreign investors act in competitive markets and choose loans bt in each period
to maximize expected profits φt, taking prices as given. Risk-neutral investors price
bonds such that they break even in expected value:
φt = −btqt + Et
[
(1−∆t+1)
1 + r bt
]
. (1.3.16)
Consequently the equilibrium government bond price qt reflects the risk of default
that investors face:
qt = Et
[
(1−∆t+1)
1 + r
]
. (1.3.17)
As international investors are risk neutral and are fully compensated for the default
risk they are indifferent between holding household debt and government bonds.
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1.3.5 Current account
In our model household and government liabilities are held vis-a`-vis the rest of the
world. Borrowing and lending of the private sector and the public sector affect the
current account as follows:
CAprivatet = −dHt + dHt−1 , (1.3.18)
CApublict = −btqt + bt−1qt−1 . (1.3.19)
The private sector current account equals the change in households’ saving. The
public current account is identical to the fiscal balance as the entire public debt stock
is held abroad. The sum of both sub-balances amounts to the aggregate current
account CAt.8
1.3.6 Laffer curve and fiscal limit
The proportional labor tax induces a distortion in the economy as it influences the
households’ labor decision, which in turn affects government tax revenues. Distor-
tionary labor taxation gives rise to a Laffer curve and, hence, to a revenue-maximizing
tax rate. With Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences tax revenues amount to:
Tt = τtWt (1− Lt) = τtWt
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
. (1.3.20)
The maximum amount of tax revenues, Tmaxt , is generated at the revenue-maximizing
tax rate which is at the peak of the Laffer curve. The revenue-maximizing tax rate,
τmaxt , is derived as follows:
∂Tt
∂τt
= Wt
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
+ τtWt
1
ω − 1
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1−1 (
−Wt
χ
)
= 0
⇔ τmaxt =
ω − 1
ω
.
Although the revenue-maximizing tax rate only depends on the Frisch elasticity of
8Note that positive values of dHt and bdt mean that households and the government have external
liabilities. An increase of dHt or bdt implies a negative current account.
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labor supply, the maximum amount of tax revenues also depends on the state of the
economy (in our case TFP).
Next, we use the revenue-maximizing tax rate to derive the fiscal limit which is
a state-dependent distribution. Following Bi (2012) the state-dependent fiscal limit
B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) is the maximum level of debt that the government is able to service, i.e.
the present discounted value of all possible future fiscal surpluses.9 The fiscal limit
depends on the exogenous states At, zt and SZ,t as well as their future realizations
(j ≥ 1) and the parameters of the model:
B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) =
∞∑
j=0
βt+j
(
Tmaxt+j − gt+j − zt+j
)
.
We derive the fiscal limit from the perspective of risk-neutral foreign investors,
who price the bonds, and thus we set the stochastic discount factor to β. To
simulate the fiscal limit B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) for given initial conditions (At, zt, SZ,t) we
randomly draw future shocks At+j, zt+j and SZ,t+j for j = 1, 2, .., N .10 Based on
m = 1, 2, ...,M simulations of B∗m(At, zt, SZ,t), we approximate the state-dependent
fiscal limit B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) by a normal distribution for each state of the economy.
It is often challenging for investors to determine whether a government is actually
willing to increase taxes or to cut spending to avoid a default. Possible resistance
by the population against austerity measures might also influence political decisions.
Hence, international investors face a high degree of uncertainty that surrounds
political processes in countries with high government debt-to-GDP ratios when
pricing government bonds. In our model the political uncertainty is reflected by
randomly drawing an effective fiscal limit, which follows a state-dependent distribution.
As in Bi (2012) the government defaults when the public debt stock bt−1 exceeds the
effective fiscal limit b∗t .11
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) show that international investors can usually
negotiate a repayment of a large share of the original claim after a default. Therefore,
we assume that the government does not default on its entire debt stock, but on the
9As Bi (2012) we do not consider the expected value of the fiscal limit, but all possible realizations
and thus the fiscal limit is a distribution.
10We simulate N = 200 periods and repeat this calculation M = 100000 (m = 1, 2, ...M) times. At
longer horizons the discounted value of government fiscal surpluses is virtually zero.
11In contrast, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) provide a model of sovereign default
where the government has an incentive to default despite being able to repay its debt.
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fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] which reflects the size of the ‘haircut’. Hence, the default scheme is:
∆t =
 0 if bt−1 < b
∗
t ∼ B∗(At, zt, SZ,t)
δ if bt−1 ≥ b∗t ∼ B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) .
(1.3.21)
1.3.7 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match annual data for Greece from 1960 to 2010. The
case of Greece is particularly interesting for our analysis as the country currently has
the highest debt stock in Europe, experiences surging sovereign interest rates and
has large external imbalances.12 Table 1.3 summarizes the calibration of the model.
In line with previous literature we pick conventional values for the discount factor,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the Frisch elasticity and the disutility of labor.
Portfolio adjustment costs are chosen to match the standard deviation of the trade
balance to output ratio following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). The steady state
level of TFP is normalized to 1.
Figure 1.1: Government spending, transfers and taxes in Greece
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (2009).
12State-dependent twin deficits would also occur when calibrating the model to another country
with a different fiscal limit as households saving increases in the proximity of the respective fiscal
limit.
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Figure 1.1 shows that the ratio of government spending relative to GDP in Greece
remained stable over the last decades. Average government spending is 16.57 percent of
GDP and average lump-sum transfers amount to 12.27 percent of GDP. The elasticity
of government spending with respect to real GDP per worker, γg, is estimated in
a linear regression for the full sample. The estimation yields a value of -0.07. The
estimated response of taxes to an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.42 in a linear
regression. The government therefore raises taxes by about 1 percentage point in
response to an increase of government debt by 2.5 percent of GDP.
Table 1.3: Model calibration to Greek economy
Parameter Value Target/Source
Discount factor β 0.95 Annual interest rate: 5.26%
Relative risk aversion σ 2 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)
Frisch elasticity 1/(1− ω) 0.9 Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
Disutility of labor χ 3.173 Steady state labor supply: 25%
Portfolio adj. costs Ψ 0.005 Std(trade balance/GDP): 7.3%
Steady state TFP A 1 TFP normalized to one
Gov. spending/GDP g/y 16.57% OECD EO No. 86 (2009)
Transfer/GDP z/y 12.27% OECD EO No. 86 (2009)
Gov. spending elasticity γg -0.07 Own estimate
Tax reaction coefficient γb 0.42 Own estimate
Government debt/GDP b/y 60% Bank of Greece (2013)
Household debt/GDP dH/y 60% Avg. external priv. debt/GDP
Tax rate τ 31.84% Avg. government debt/GDP
Default rate δ 15% Bi (2012), EU Commission
Productivity persistence ρA 0.53 Own estimate
Std. dev. of prod. shock σA 0.027 Own estimate
Transfer persistence ρz 0.9 Bi et al. (2013)
Expl. transfer growth µ 1.01 Bi et al. (2013)
Markov switching prob. pMS 0.9 Bi et al. (2013)
Std. dev. transfer shock σz 0.07 Own estimate
Average fiscal limit:
Mean (% of GDP) B∗ 156% MCMC simulation
Std. dev. (% of GDP) σB∗ 21% MCMC simulation
We set the steady state of total external debt-to-GDP ratio to 120 percent to match
average total external liabilities of Greece from 1995 to 2010. About half of total
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gross external debt are public sector liabilities.13 Thus, in our calibration, half of
total external debt is public external debt and the other half is private sector external
debt. As total external liabilities are 120 percent of GDP, we set both the private
and public external debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent of GDP. To match the average
government debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent we set the steady state tax rate to 31.84
percent.
We consider various sources to calibrate the size of the haircut in our model for the
case of Greece. The European Commission (2011) forecast in autumn 2011 published
before the debt restructuring in 2012 reports a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 198.3
percent at the end of 2012. The most recent forecast release in spring 2013 of the
European Commission (2013) for the government debt-to-GDP ratio after the debt
restructuring is 161.6 percent, suggesting that the haircut is estimated to effectively
lower public debt by 18 percent at the end of 2012. Considering the empirical evidence
of previous debt restructurings, Bi (2012) computes historical haircuts indicating an
average size of 13 percent (excluding default events below a haircut of 3 percent).
A haircut of this size is also in line with estimates in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2008), Panizza (2008) and Moody’s (2011). Therefore, we choose a conservative
value of 15 percent for the default fraction.14
We estimate the exogenous processes for productivity and transfers using HP-
filtered data. The log of productivity as measured by real GDP per worker has
a persistence of 0.53 and a standard deviation of 0.027 of the shock. Figure 1.1
illustrates that transfer payments from the government to households continuously
increased in Greece over the last decades. Following Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013)
we set the Markov switching probability pMS of the transfer process to 0.9. This
implies that on average the transfer process stays in each regime for ten years. The
parameter of the explosive transfer growth µ is set to 1.01 to match the growth of
transfers in Greece since 1960 and ρz is set to 0.9. The estimated standard deviation
13Based on data from the Bank of Greece 56 percent of total external debt is government debt. To
our knowledge disaggregated data for the pre-1995 period is not available.
14In March 2012 Greece implemented a 53.5 percent haircut to the nominal value of debt held by
the private sector, which roughly held half of the total debt stock suggesting a haircut of around
25 percent. Later in 2012 the Troika (ECB, IMF and European Commission) had to recapitalize
the Greek banking system, which was holding around one-third of government debt, effectively
reducing the net impact of the debt restructuring. However, assuming a higher default fraction
does not alter the mechanism of the model and only changes the maximum risk premia that the
international investors demand from the government.
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of the transfer shock is 0.07 in a least squares regression.
Based on the calibration we determine the resulting average mean and standard
deviation across all fiscal limits. The mean of all fiscal limits is 156 percent of steady
state output and the standard deviation is 21 percent as a fraction of steady state
GDP. The next section addresses how the fiscal limit changes with the state of the
economy.
1.3.8 Laffer curve and fiscal limit for Greece
The revenue maximizing tax rate only depends on the Frisch elasticity. Figure 1.2
shows the Laffer curve for three different values of the Frisch elasticity. Based on the
calibration of our model the revenue-maximizing tax rate is 52.6 percent. This tax
rate is close to the revenue maximizing labor tax rate of about 60 percent for Greece
estimated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
Figure 1.2: Sensitivity of Laffer curve to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
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Figure 1.3 displays the distribution of the fiscal limit based on the calibrated model.
The fiscal limit depends on the state of the economy.
The left panel depicts the probability density function for different productivity
states, while the right panel shows the cumulative density function. As the fiscal limit
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Figure 1.3: State-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit
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Notes: State-dependent distributions of the fiscal limit for different TFP states and transfers
in steady state of the stationary regime. Each distribution is approximated by a normal
distribution. The left panel shows the probability density functions and the right panel shows
the cumulative density functions.
shifts with the state of the economy, the default probability is also state-dependent.
In a recession, i.e. in a low productivity state, the average fiscal limit is much lower
compared to an economy that is in a high productivity state. During an economic
downturn tax revenues are smaller and productivity is likely to stay at low levels due
to its persistence. These two effects lower average future fiscal surpluses, shifting
the mean of the fiscal limit to lower government debt-to-GDP ratios. The mean of
the fiscal limit is at 163 percent of GDP for an intermediate TFP state, 146 percent
of GDP for the lowest TFP state and 183 percent of GDP for the highest TFP
state when transfers are at the mean and in the stationary regime.15 For low TFP
states sovereign risk premia occur around 130 percent government debt-to-GDP. This
15The fiscal limit also shifts with different states of transfer spending and the Markov switching
process between stable and explosive transfer growth. The mean of the fiscal limit is at 140 percent
of GDP when transfers are in the highest state and at 189 percent of GDP when transfers are in
the lowest state with productivity at steady state and in the stationary transfer regime. A shift
from the stable to the explosive transfer regime leads to a shift of the mean of the fiscal limit from
163 percent of debt to GDP to 150 percent of debt to GDP with productivity and transfers at
their steady state.
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value is close to actual data for Greece as sovereign bond spreads have increased
dramatically since April 2010 when government debt-to-GDP was 131 percent. Since
2008 the country is also in a severe recession, which is reflected by a low TFP state
in the model.
1.3.9 Solution method
The model features non-linearities due to the possibility of government default
and the regime switching of government transfers. For our calibration the fiscal
limit is far away from the steady state. For these reasons we use a global solution
method to solve the model. The complete set of model equilibrium conditions is
listed in Appendix 1.C. We express the model by two first-order difference equations
to solve for two policy functions. In particular, the first equilibrium condition is the
households’ first-order condition (1.3.7) and the second equilibrium condition is the
government budget constraint (1.3.11) combined with the first-order condition of
foreign investors (1.3.17):
λ(Ψt)
(
1− ψ((fdH (Ψt)− dH)
)
= β (1 + r)Etλ(Ψt+1) (1.3.22)
bdt + gt + zt − τ(Ψt)At(1− L(Ψt))
f b(Ψt)
= Et
{
(1−∆(f b(Ψt), fdH (Ψt), At+1, zt+1, SZ,t+1)
1 + r
}
(1.3.23)
where Ψt =
{
bdt , d
H
t−1, At, zt, SZ,t
}
is the state vector of the economy. To solve the
model we employ the non-linear algorithm described in Coleman (1991) and Davig
(2004). This procedures discretizes the state space Ψt and finds a fixed point in the
policy rules bt = f b(Ψt) and dHt = fd
H (ψt) for each grid point in the state space.
Further details on the solution method are provided in Appendix 1.D.
1.4 Model results
First, we show that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account
changes with the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, we provide intuition for
the change of the correlation examining policy rules. Finally, to illustrate the state-
dependent model dynamics, we present impulse responses to productivity shocks at a
low and at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio.
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1.4.1 State-dependence of twin deficits
Table 1.4 presents the correlations between the fiscal balance and the current
account at a low and at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio.16 The correlation
of the two balances declines as government debt-to-GDP levels increase, in line
with our empirical results in Section 1.2. The model with both shocks implies a
perfect correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account for public debt-to-
GDP at 60 percent. The correlation of the twins declines to 0.85 at a government
debt-to-GDP ratio of 140 percent. Therefore the change in the correlation is 0.15
when moving from the low government debt regime to the high debt regime. At low
government debt levels government and household debt co-move almost one-for-one
(corr(CAprivate, FB) = 0.99). However, at high government debt-to-GDP levels the
correlation is much lower (corr(CAprivate, FB) = 0.04).
To compare our model-implied correlation with actual data we report the change
of the state-dependent correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account
calculated in Section 1.2 for 15 European countries. Table 1.4 reports the absolute
change (0.19) in the correlations of the twins between the high and low government
debt regime in the data. The model-implied change in the correlation (0.15) is close
to the one found in the data.
To shed light on the relative importance of each shock Table 1.4 also reports the
model-implied correlations conditional on each shock. Even though the correlation
of the fiscal balance and the current account conditional on transfer shocks is high
(0.86) in the low debt regime, it is negative (-0.36) in the high debt regime. In line
with Corsetti and Müller (2008) we find that the unconditional correlation of the two
balances in the model is dominated by TFP shocks.
1.4.2 Model dynamics
To highlight the key transmission mechanisms we discuss the properties of two
policy functions: sovereign interest rates and households’ saving. International
investors demand risk premia when government debt approaches the fiscal limit and
16The reported statistics for the model are an average over 500 simulations of eight years each. We
only include simulations without default episodes as a default implies a large current account
surplus. We choose a short simulation period to avoid a possible bias in the reported results by
excluding too many draws that result in a government default.
27
Chapter 1
Table 1.4: State-dependent correlations of fiscal balance and current account
Low vs. high government debt-to-GDP: ∆ corr(FB,CA)
Data 0.19
Model 0.15
Low government debt-to-GDP at 60 percent: corr(FB,CA)
Both shocks 1.00
TFP shocks 1.00
Transfer shocks 0.86
High government debt-to-GDP at 140 percent: corr(FB,CA)
Both shocks 0.85
TFP shocks 0.86
Transfer shocks -0.36
Notes: Correlations of fiscal balance (FB) and current account (CA), both in percent of GDP.
The low government debt level is the steady state value of the model. ∆ corr(FB,CA) denotes
the difference between the correlation of the low debt regime and the correlation of the high
debt regime. All simulations are based on the stationary transfer regime.
the probability of default increases (see Figure 1.4). Up to a government debt-to-GDP
ratio of around 100 percent foreign investors do not demand sovereign default risk
premia as they expect no risk of a government default in the next period independent
of today’s productivity state. Hence, sovereign bond yields equal the risk-free rate.
Sovereign interest rates increase up to 24 percent for high government debt levels.
Since international investors are risk neutral they demand risk premia that offset the
expected loss due to the possible government default.
The government debt level at which investors demand risk premia depends on
the state of the economy as the latter affects the fiscal limit. For example, if the
economy is in a recession, i.e. in a low TFP state, tax revenues are low and the fiscal
limit is shifted to the left. Hence, during a recession the probability of sovereign
default is much higher than during an economic boom. Consequently, at the lowest
productivity state default risk premia begin to emerge at around 100 percent of
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government debt-to-GDP, whereas at the highest TFP state risk premia emerge at
around 160 percent of government debt-to-GDP.
Figure 1.4: Sovereign interest rates at different government debt-to-GDP ratios
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is in the stationary regime. Horizontal axis: ratio of government debt-to-GDP. Vertical axis: in
percentage points.
Households trade assets with foreign investors to smooth consumption and to insure
against expected tax changes that result from the risk of government default. The
saving decision at different productivity states depends non-linearly on the public
debt stock (see Figure 1.5). When government debt-to-GDP is around 60 percent
(steady state) households accumulate debt relative to steady state household debt to
smooth consumption at a low TFP state. However, around 140 percent government
debt-to-GDP ratio households save relative to steady state household debt in all TFP
states as public debt increases.
The households’ saving decision is influenced by the level of government debt due
to the possibility of government default in the proximity of the fiscal limit. A more
costly roll-over of government debt increases the fiscal deficit and leads to higher
expected future labor taxes. However, households benefit from a realized government
default as a default leads to lower government debt and, thus, to lower distortionary
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taxes.17 The distortion caused by labor taxes increases with higher government debt
levels. To insure against higher expected future labor taxes households save relative
to steady state household debt when government debt is high even when faced with
negative TFP shocks.
Figure 1.5: Households’ saving decision at different government debt-to-GDP ratios
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Notes: Transfer spending is at steady state and in the stable process. Horizontal axis: ratio of
government debt-to-GDP. Vertical axis: households’ choice of debt in percent of GDP when
the households’ debt stock in the last period is at steady state.
1.4.3 Impulse response functions
We simulate the model conditional on a negative productivity shock at different
government debt-to-GDP ratios to assess the state-dependent dynamics. A negative
TFP shock captures the economic downturn of Greece which is in a recession since
2008. The shock destabilizes the fiscal sector leading to sovereign interest rate spreads
at high public debt levels.
17Introducing an exogenous cost of default as in Arellano (2008) would lead to a stronger increase
of household saving at high government debt as households would try to insure against this cost.
This would lead to a stronger reduction of the correlation of the twins.
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Figure 1.6 displays the effects of a negative TFP shock at a low (60%) and a high
(140%) government debt-to-GDP ratio. At a low government debt-to-GDP ratio the
negative productivity shock causes labor and tax revenues to decline, government
spending to increase and the fiscal balance turns negative. Higher tax rates and
lower output leads households to increase debt to smooth consumption. Households
therefore increase private debt, i.e. the change in private saving is negative. Hence, the
change in private saving and the fiscal balance co-move positively and the aggregate
current account turns negative. Thus, the correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account is unity.
At high government debt levels a negative productivity shock of the same size
again leads to a negative fiscal balance. Growing government debt brings the stock
of sovereign debt close to the fiscal limit, leading to a surge of sovereign risk premia.
Households increase saving as they expect that further increases of government debt
and tax rates are very likely and the dispersion of tax rates increases. The change
in private saving therefore turns positive and outweighs the negative contribution
of the fiscal balance such that the current account moves into surplus. Due to
the endogenous reaction of household saving, the correlation between the fiscal
balance and the current account is much lower at high government debt-to-GDP
than at a low ratio. In addition, the simulation reflects a situation where increasing
risk premia destabilize the government debt-to-GDP ratio as observed during the
current European sovereign debt crisis. Without a strong reduction of government
expenditures or higher tax revenues the government debt stock is not sustainable
resulting in a default in accordance with the actual debt restructuring of Greece in
2012.
In line with the empirical results our model provides an explanation for the decline
in the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account as the government
debt-to-GDP ratio increases. In the model the households’ optimal saving decision
changes with the government debt-to-GDP ratio which explains the change of the
correlation. In particular, as illustrated by the impulse responses to a negative TFP
shock, private saving increases at high government debt, but falls at low government
debt-to-GDP ratios. Hence, the correlation of the ‘twins’ is state-dependent and at
high government debt households’ saving behavior alleviates the fall in the current
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Figure 1.6: Simulation of negative TFP shock at low vs. high government debt
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 3 percent negative productivity shock. We initialize the simulation
at 60% government debt-to-GDP (blue solid line) and 140% government debt-to-GDP (red
dashed line). Household debt is set to its ergodic mean. A time unit is one year.
account. The change in the model-based correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account is 0.15, which is in line with the change in the empirical correlation
of the twins.
1.5 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, we estimate a government debt-to-GDP threshold
based on a dynamic panel threshold model following Kremer et al. (2013) for a sample
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of 15 European countries. One advantage of the dynamic panel estimation procedure
is that we estimate the threshold rather than exogenously imposing it. We contribute
to the twin deficits debate by showing that the correlation of the fiscal balance and
the current account depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Based on the
estimated threshold of 72 percent we distinguish between a low and a high government
debt regime. For each regime we calculate the correlation of the fiscal balance and
the current account and find that the state-dependent correlation falls by 0.19 when
moving from observations below the threshold to those that are above the threshold.
In the second part of this chapter, we examine a small open economy model allowing
for sovereign default to show that the correlation of the twin deficits depends on
the level of government debt in line with the observed empirical findings. At high
government debt-to-GDP ratios the looming sovereign default risk increases sovereign
interest rates, which deteriorate the fiscal balance. Rising sovereign debt levels lead to
higher labor taxes, inducing households to increase saving. Also, precautionary saving
increases as the dispersion of future expected taxes rises the closer the government
debt stock moves to the fiscal limit. Non-linear model simulations reveal that the
households’ saving channel partially offsets fiscal deficits at high government debt-
to-GDP ratios, inducing a decline in the correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account. The decline in the correlation of 0.15 is close to the change of the
correlation in the empirical analysis.
The results of this chapter suggest that households’ saving has an offsetting effect
on substantial and persistent fiscal deficits due to high sovereign risk premia. At
high government debt-to-GDP ratios households save more than at times when the
economy has a low government debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, our evidence — in line
with recent data for southern European countries — points to a potential rebalancing
of the current account as households increase saving, because of large fiscal deficits
that prevail due to high borrowing costs.
The recent global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis with their
severe macroeconomic effects have shown that state-dependent dynamics can be
important. Areas in which state-dependent dynamics are likely to play a crucial
role are, for example, the size of fiscal multipliers and the effectiveness of austerity
programs. This chapter reveals another example of state-dependence and shows that
the size of the government debt-to-GDP ratio affects the co-movement of the fiscal
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balance and the current account.
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1.A Data description
Table 1.5: List of variables and definitions
Variable Source Description
Current account IMF WEO Current account balance (in % of GDP)
Fiscal balance IMF WEO Fiscal balance (in % of GDP). Net lend-
ing is calculated as revenue minus total
expenditure.
Government debt IMF WEO Government debt (in % of GDP). Gross
debt consists of all liabilities that re-
quire payment or payments of interest
and/or principal by the debtor to the
creditor.
Terms of trade IMF IFS Export price index divided by import
price index
Openness OECD Absolute value of exports plus absolute
value of imports (in % of GDP)
Relative income IMF WEO GDP per capita (PPP) relative to U.S.
GDP per capita (PPP)
Output gap IMF WEO Output gap (in % of potential GDP)
Change of total invest. IMF WEO Change of total investment (in % of
GDP)
Labor productivity OECD Labor productivity of the total economy
REER BIS Weighted average of bilateral exchange
rates adjusted by relative consumer
prices
Dependency ratio WDI Age dependency ratio (in % of working-
age population)
Data sources: IMF WEO: IMF World Economic Outlook (Oct 2012), IMF IFS: IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (May 2012), OECD: OECD Economic Outlook No. 92 (Dec 2012),
BIS: Bank for International Settlements effective exchange rate indices: narrow indices (Jan
2013), World Bank WDI: World Bank Development Indicators (Jan 2013).
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics of dataset
Country T mean(CA/GDP ) mean(FB/GDP ) mean(Debt/GDP )
Austria 23 0.46 -2.75 63.1
Belgium 20 3.33 -2.70 109.4
Germany 16 2.47 -2.79 64.5
Denmark 13 2.68 1.24 51.7
Spain 31 -2.95 -3.41 46.6
Finland 31 1.41 1.01 33.9
France 31 0.12 -3.34 48.7
Great Britain 31 -1.41 -3.16 44.5
Greece 23 -6.01 -8.20 97.8
Ireland 31 -1.84 -4.52 68.7
Italy 22 -0.41 -5.83 108.1
The Netherlands 16 5.29 -1.73 58.2
Norway 31 6.31 7.25 41.3
Portugal 16 -4.84 -2.01 61.3
Sweden 18 5.11 -1.06 55.7
Notes: T: Maximum number of time periods available, CA/GDP : Current account in percent
of GDP, FB/GDP : Fiscal balance in percent of GDP, Debt/GDP : Government debt in
percent of GDP.
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1.B Empirical estimation
1.B.1 Data
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 15 European countries from 1980 to 2010.18
We include a broad set of control variables that potentially affect the current account.
In particular, along with the fiscal balance the baseline specification includes the
terms of trade, openness, relative income to the U.S. economy, output gap (in
percent of potential GDP), the change in total investment (in percent of GDP),
labor productivity (of the total economy), the real effective exchange rate and the
dependency ratio (in percent of working-age population). Detailed information about
the data set is given in Appendix 1.A.
1.B.2 Methodology
We estimate a dynamic panel threshold model of the form
yit = µi + χyi,t−1 + β1zitI(qit ≤ γ) + β2zitI(qit > γ) + α′xit + uit, (1.B.1)
where subscript i = 1, ..., N represents the country and subscript t = 1, ..., T
denotes the time period. yit is the dependent variable, µi is the country specific fixed
effect and yi,t−1 is an endogenous regressor. zit is a vector of explanatory regressors,
I(·) is an indicator function indicating the regime defined by the threshold variable
qit, and γ is the threshold level. Thus, the impact of zit on yit can potentially vary
depending on whether the threshold variable qit is below or above the threshold.
The threshold level γ splits the sample into two regimes, allowing for the estimation
of the regime-dependent impact of zit as measured by the coefficients β1 and β2.
Furthermore, xit contains a set of explanatory regressors which are independent of
the threshold. The error term uit is independent and identically distributed with
mean zero and finite variance.
Our estimation strategy follows Kremer et al. (2013) who overcome several econo-
metric challenges. In particular, they combine the estimation methods of non-dynamic
18The sample includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden.
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panel threshold models in Hansen (1999) with the estimation strategy in Caner and
Hansen (2004) that applies to cross-sectional threshold models with endogenous
regressors. Hansen (1999) provides a method to estimate threshold effects in non-
dynamic panel models where all regressors have to be exogenous. To eliminate the
fixed effects mean differencing is applied. However, in a dynamic panel model as
considered in equation (1.B.1) mean differencing potentially leads to inconsistent
estimates as the lagged dependent variable will always be correlated with the mean of
the individual errors and, thus, with all transformed individual errors (see Arellano,
2003, p. 17). Caner and Hansen (2004) develop an estimator and an inference theory
for models with endogenous regressors and an exogenous threshold variable. Their
theory applies to cross-sectional data and therefore needs to be extended to the
estimation of panel data. For the endogenous regressor an instrumental variable
estimation is applied. Building on these two papers, Kremer et al. (2013) provide a
new, dynamic version of Hansen’s panel threshold model. As in Caner and Hansen
(2004) their procedure eliminates fixed effects with the forward orthogonal deviations
transformation suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). Subtracting the average of all
future available observations of a variable avoids serial correlation of the transformed
errors.
For our empirical exercise we apply the dynamic panel threshold model to estimate
the relationship of the fiscal balance and the current account depending on the ratio
of government debt-to-GDP:
CAit = µi + χCAi,t−1 (1.B.2)
+ β1FBitI(DebtitGDPit ≤ γ) + β2FBitI(DebtitGDPit > γ) + α′xit + uit,
where the current account (CA) and the fiscal balance (FB) are measured in percent
of GDP. The threshold variable is the ratio of government debt-to-GDP. The set of
control variables xit includes the variables described above.
Following previous literature (e.g. Bussière et al., 2006), we include the lagged
current account as a regressor in the baseline specification. We instrument for
CAi,t−1 using lagged variables (CAi,t−3, CAi,t−4 and CAi,t−5). Employing few lags
prevents overfitting the predicted variable and reduces a possible bias of the coefficient
estimates. However, as there is a trade-off between bias and efficiency in small samples,
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using only few lags comes at the cost of loosing efficiency. To assess the importance
of the number of lags included we repeat the estimation using all of the available lags
and find that the results are very close to the baseline results (see Appendix 1.B.6).
1.B.3 Further empirical results
The first column of Table 1.7 reports the results of our baseline specification. The
key results are discussed in Section 1.2.2 in the main text.
The terms of trade have a significant, positive coefficient (0.05). An increase in
the terms of trade reflects that the prices of the export goods increase relative to
the prices of the import goods. The positive coefficient is consistent with a positive
relationship between national savings and a terms of trade improvement. The partial
correlation of openness (defined as imports plus exports in percent of GDP) with
the current account is very small and insignificant (-0.01). The estimated coefficient
of the relative income to the U.S. has a positive sign (0.01) which might reflect
higher investment and borrowing in poorer countries due to either a catch-up effect or
higher expected future income. The coefficient is, however, insignificant which is not
surprising given that the considered countries all have an income level comparable
to the one of the U.S. economy. The output gap co-moves negatively (-0.28) with
the current account. A country experiencing an economic expansion would therefore,
ceteris paribus, experience a deterioration of the current account which indicates
that the positive impact of higher saving is overcompensated by higher investment
inflows. As expected from the current account identity a change of investment is
associated with a decline (-0.14) of the current account. The coefficient for labor
productivity is insignificant (0.04), while the coefficient of the real effective exchange
rate is negative (-0.06). The significant positive coefficient (0.16) of the dependency
ratio could be explained by lower investment in countries which have a larger share
of the population out of the labor force.
We also estimate a non-dynamic panel model (see right column of Table 1.7) to
compare our results to previous studies. The threshold estimate in the non-dynamic
model is slightly higher than in the dynamic model. While we confirm our previous
finding that the partial correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account is
lower at high government debt levels, we find that both estimated coefficients are
larger compared to the estimates of the dynamic model. These results also highlight
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Table 1.7: Estimation results
Variable Dynamic panel Non-dynamic panel
Current account (t− 1) 0.59***
(0.16)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) 0.16** 0.43***
(0.07) (0.06)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > γˆ) -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Terms of trade 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02)
Openness -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 0.08
(0.04) (0.06)
Output gap -0.28*** -0.67***
(in % of potential GDP) (0.11) (0.07)
Change of total investment -0.14 0.12
(in % of GDP) (0.08) (0.08)
Labor productivity 0.04 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
Real effective exchange rate -0.06*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.02)
Dependency ratio 0.16** 0.37***
(% of working-age pop.) (0.08) (0.09)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 75.0
95 % confidence region [69.4− 75.0] [69.4− 91.05]
Total number of observations 353 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% (75.0%) splits the sample into 260
(271) obs. below and 93 (82) obs. above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal
balance are measured in percent of GDP.
the importance of including the lagged current account in our baseline estimation.
Compared to the non-dynamic panel the high persistence of the current account and
the lower regime-dependent estimates in the dynamic panel model suggest that our
baseline specification corrects for a potential bias due to omitting an endogenous
regressor.
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1.B.4 Robustness
We estimate a range of alternative specifications to confirm and extend our baseline
estimation results. First, we estimate the model for the period 1980 to 2007, excluding
the period from 2008 to 2010. The financial crisis with its strong influence on average
debt levels, fiscal balances and current accounts could potentially affect our estimation
results. Second, we re-estimate the model excluding countries with very high or low
government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Excluding the financial crisis period we estimate the same government debt-to-GDP
threshold of 71.8 percent (see first column of Table 1.8). The coefficients for the control
variables are close to those of our baseline results. The exclusion of the financial
crisis period slightly affects the estimate of the fiscal balance: The estimate below
the threshold increases from 0.16 to 0.30 and at the same time becomes statistically
more significant. The estimate at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio decreases
from -0.04 to -0.21. Thus, the difference between the state-dependent coefficients
of the fiscal balance becomes larger when excluding the financial crisis episode. In
comparison to the baseline results household saving therefore compensates a fiscal
deficit less in the low debt regime. The exclusion of the crisis period confirms our
baseline results: households become more Ricardian at high government debt levels,
increasingly compensating the impact of fiscal deficits on the current account by
higher household saving.
In a second robustness check we exclude the country with the lowest and several
countries with a high average government debt-to-GDP ratio from our sample (see
Table 1.8). These countries might influence the estimation results as a majority of
their observations are assigned to only one of the two debt regimes. Finland is the
country with the lowest average government debt-to-GDP ratio, while there are three
countries with relatively high average debt-to-GDP ratios: Belgium, Greece and Italy.
We exclude one country at a time. Excluding Belgium (the country with the highest
average debt-to-GDP ratio) yields the same estimated threshold of 71.8 percent and
the exclusion is inconsequential for the estimation results. Excluding Italy or Finland
also yields the same estimated thresholds and similar coefficient estimates as in the
baseline estimation. The threshold estimate is slightly larger when excluding Greece,
but the point estimates are very similar to the results of the complete sample.
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Table 1.8: Robustness
Variable Subperiod Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
1980-2007 Belgium Italy Greece Finland
CA (t− 1) 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.50***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Fiscal balance 0.30*** 0.17** 0.20** 0.17** 0.23***
(Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Fiscal balance -0.21** -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.08
(Debt/GDP > γˆ) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Terms of trade 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Openness 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative income -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.02 0.04
to U.S. (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Output gap -0.49*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.27** -0.38***
(in % of pot. GDP) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Change of total inv. -0.13 -0.13 -0.17** -0.17** -0.20**
(in % of GDP) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Labor productivity 0.07** 0.03 0.04* 0.04 0.05*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Real effective -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.04*
exchange rate (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dependency ratio (in % 0.25*** 0.19** 0.22** 0.19** 0.22**
of working-age pop.) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Threshold (% of GDP) γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 86.9 γˆ = 71.8
95 % confidence region [69.4-74.1] [69.4-75.0] [69.4-75.0] [82.3-91.05] [69.4-88.0]
Total number of obs. 308 333 331 330 322
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The current account and the fiscal balance are measured in
percent of GDP.
1.B.5 Discussion of related empirical literature
A number of papers estimate the medium-term relationship between the fiscal
balance and the current account estimating panel models without threshold. Chinn
and Prasad (2003) estimate a static panel for a large set of 88 countries for the sample
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ranging from 1971 to 1995 and find a significant point estimate for the fiscal balance
coefficient of 0.3. Chinn and Ito (2007) report a point estimate of around 0.15 for both
a sample of 89 countries as well as for a sub-sample of industrialized countries from
1971 to 2004. Gruber and Kamin (2007) report a value of 0.11 using a longer time
span but fewer countries (61) than Chinn and Prasad (2003). The panel estimation
of 21 OECD countries in Bussière et al. (2010) yields a significant, positive point
estimate of 0.14. Bussière et al. (2006) employ various estimators (LSDV, IV and
GMM) to a dynamic panel and find a positive relationship between the fiscal balance
and the current account ranging from 0.06 to 0.25. The estimation is based on data
for 21 OECD countries for a sample from 1980 to 2003. Their paper also finds a
highly significant coefficient for the lagged current account. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2012) estimate a static panel for 65 economies for a large sample ranging from 1969
to 2008 finding a highly significant positive fiscal balance coefficient of 0.24. Based
on these studies there exists compelling evidence for a small, positive relationship of
the fiscal balance and the current account. Studies that estimate a dynamic model
find a high persistence of the lagged current account comparable to our estimation
results. Estimating our dynamic panel model without a threshold we also find that
there is a positive relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance.
In a related study Röhn (2010) finds for a panel of 16 OECD countries that
increasing private saving offsets a deficit financed rise in public spending to a larger
extend the higher the level of public debt. This implies that consumers become
more Ricardian with growing levels of public debt. The findings of Röhn (2010) are
consistent with the fact that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current
account declines with rising government debt levels as increasing household saving
offsets the negative effect of government deficits on the current account at high public
debt levels.
Our results corroborate those of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) who find that
the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account depends on
the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Using a sample of eleven Euro area countries
for the years 1981 to 2005 they obtain a significant positive coefficient of 0.36 for
the estimate of the fiscal balance for the lowest debt regime. For the highest debt
regime the estimate is -0.61 but it is not statistically different from zero. They also
estimate a sample of 22 industrialized countries and obtain an estimate for the fiscal
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balance coefficient of 0.45 (significant) and -0.11 (not significant) for the lowest and
highest debt regime, respectively. In difference to the estimation strategy used in our
study, the results of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) are based on the estimation
and inference theory for non-dynamic panels by Hansen (1999).19 Due to the high
persistence of the current account the estimates of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008)
are potentially biased. Applying the dynamic version of Hansen’s model proposed
by Kremer et al. (2013), we avoid a potential bias. We obtain consistent estimates
that are smaller than those of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008), but we confirm the
regime-dependent influence of government debt-to-GDP ratios on the correlation of
the fiscal balance and the current account.
19These authors use a different sample of countries and analyze a shorter time span.
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1.B.6 Additional estimation results
Table 1.9: Estimation results using all available lags
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Current account (t− 1) 0.56*** (0.09)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ 71.8%) 0.17*** (0.05)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > 71.8%) -0.04 (0.04)
Terms of trade 0.05*** (0.01)
Openness −0.01 (0.01)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 (0.04)
Output gap (in % of potential GDP) −0.30*** (0.07)
Change of total investment (in % of GDP) −0.12* (0.07)
Labor productivity 0.04* (0.02)
Real effective exchange rate −0.06*** (0.02)
Dependency ratio (% of working-age pop.) 0.17** (0.07)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8
99 % confidence region [69.4− 88.0]
Total number of observations 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% splits the sample into 260 observations
below and 93 observations above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal balance
are measured in percent of GDP. We use the largest available number of lags for the current
account as instruments for the lagged current account.
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1.C Non-linear model equilibrium conditions
(1− Lt) =
[
At(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
(1.C.1)
λt =
(
ct − χ(1− Lt)
ω
ω
)−σ
(1.C.2)
λt
(
1− ψ(dHt − dH)
)
= β(1 + r)Et(λt+1) (1.C.3)
ct +
ψ
2
(
dHt − dH
)2
= At (1− τt) (1− Lt) + zt + dHt − (1 + r)dHt−1 (1.C.4)
yt = At (1− Lt) (1.C.5)
τtAt (1− Lt) + btqt = (1−4t) bt−1 + gt + zt (1.C.6)
bdt = (1−4t) bt−1 (1.C.7)
qt = Et
[
(1−∆t+1)
1 + r
]
(1.C.8)
Tt = τtAt
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At(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
(1.C.9)
τt − τ = γb
(
bdt − b
)
(1.C.10)
zt =
 (1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 1µzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 2 (1.C.11)
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1.D Non-linear computational method
1. Policy rules. To solve the non-linear model we use the monotone map method
that is described in Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004). First, we discretize the
state space for each state variable, i.e. Ψt =
{
bdt , d
H
t−1, At, zt, SZ,t
}
. Second, we
solve a simplified version of the model without default (δ = 0) with a first-order
approximation and use these policy functions to generate an initial set of decision
rules denoted by bdt = f bj (Ψt) and dHt = fdj (Ψt). These rules are substituted into
the two core equations of the model (the Euler equations (1.3.22) and (1.3.23)).
Numerical integration is used to evaluate expectations about future variables.
Solving this system for the state variables at each grid point yields updated
values for the decision rules, i.e. bdt = f bj+1(Ψt) and dHt = fdj+1(Ψt) which we
use as a new guess to substitute into (1.3.22) and (1.3.23). We repeatedly
update the decision rules until the decision rules converge at every grid point in
the state space i.e. |f bj (Ψt)− f bj+1(Ψt)| <  and |fdj (Ψt)− fdj+1(Ψt)| < , where
 = 10−6. We obtain a solution of the non-linear model on our grid points.
Using the decision rules f b(Ψt) and fd
H (Ψt) of the model, we can solve for the
remaining variables.
2. Simulation results. Given the policy rules we simulate the model economy. We
initialize the simulation in the ergodic mean for all variables and then feed
in various shock sequences for our exogenous processes. Given these shock
sequences, we evaluate the evolution of the endogenous states using linear
interpolation. In each period we randomly draw the effective fiscal limit from
the state-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit. The government defaults on
the fraction δ when its debt stock exceeds the effective fiscal limit.
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Sovereign Borrowing, Financial Assistance,
and Debt Repudiation
2.1 Introduction
Does the availability of financial assistance help to avoid sovereign defaults? In
the light of the European sovereign debt crisis this question has again become a
pressing concern for policymakers. The overall impact of the availability of financial
assistance is a priori unclear as it leads to two counteracting effects. On the one
hand, financial assistance as provided e.g. by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can counter runs by investors due to
self-fulfilling default expectations and bridge deficits in times of low output and high
debt levels. On the other hand, by providing insurance the availability of financial
assistance lowers risk premia for troubled countries on international capital markets
for a given debt level. Such a downward shift in borrowing costs might induce
governments to raise debt levels and thus increase default incentives. We analyze the
implications of the availability of financial assistance quantitatively within a model
of sovereign default. The model features defaults due to bad fundamentals, runs by
investors due to multiple equilibria, and an official lending facility that captures the
main characteristics of actual international financial institutions. Runs on sovereign
debt markets constitute a major threat for indebted governments as they can push
countries into default that have in principle sound fundamentals and would not default
otherwise. An official lending facility can help to prevent the possible coordination
failure as financial assistance supplies the government with funds even when there
might be a run by private investors on the market for government debt.
Our model is based on the standard sovereign default model à la Eaton and Gersovitz
49
Chapter 2
(1981) and builds on Cole and Kehoe (2000) by considering multiple equilibria due
to runs by investors. The government of a small open economy can borrow both
from private international investors and from an official lending facility. Each period
the government decides whether to repay its debt or to default on its obligations. A
default entails exclusion from international financial markets and a loss in output. As
reported by Roubini and Setser (2004) bailout loans are de facto senior to market debt.
We include this characteristic into the model: The government can either default
on its market debt only or jointly on both types of debt.1 In addition to defaults
by the government that are caused by bad fundamentals, the private debt market
is prone to self-fulfilling runs, in which the investors refuse to provide new credit
and the government defaults. Market debt is priced endogenously by risk neutral
international investors acting on perfectly competitive markets. In contrast, bailout
loans are always provided according to a fix price schedule that contains a surcharge
on the risk-free interest rate. Using financial assistance is therefore unattractive for a
country that can borrow at the risk-free rate from international investors. However,
when default risk and risk premia are high, turning to bailout loans becomes relatively
more attractive. In exchange for loans, the official lending facility demands policy
adjustments (‘conditionality’) from the government: The government has to restrict
deficits as long as it keeps making use of financial assistance.
For our quantitative analysis we calibrate the model to match the data around the
Argentinean default in 2001. During this crisis Argentina resorted to the IMF for
financial assistance. At its peak in 2002, the use of IMF loans by Argentina reached
close to 15 percent of GDP, which is at the upper end of the observed ratios for the
crisis events in emerging economies between 1994 and 2002 (see Figure 2.1).2 Our
model captures key features of Argentinean business cycle statistics. To analyze the
effect of the presence of the official lending facility on the default probability we
compare our benchmark model and a version of the model without bailout loans. We
find that the availability of financial assistance reduces the frequency of run-driven
1In the following the term ‘market debt’ denotes credit provided by private international investors
on international debt markets. We use the terms ‘bailout loans’ or ‘financial assistance’ for credit
provided by the official lending facility.
2A detailed empirical account of default events in several emerging markets economies in the 1990s
and early 2000s is provided by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), while Roubini and Setser
(2004) examine the crisis events of that time with a special focus on the implications regarding
crisis resolution policies.
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defaults. However, its presence leads to substantially higher debt levels and a small
overall increase in the default probability. For a given level of market debt the
presence of financial assistance reduces the probability of a default by providing credit
at comparatively low interest rates when international investors charge prohibitively
high interest rates. At the same time it reduces the size of the crisis zone. The
crisis zone consists of combinations of output and debt levels for which a self-fulfilling
debt run can occur due to a coordination failure among investors. The reduction of
the size of the crisis zone leads to a decrease in the number of run-driven defaults.
Hence, defaults on market debt become, all else equal, less likely. This insurance
effect of the financial assistance reduces the interest rates charged by international
investors. Lower interest rates in turn induce the country to increase its borrowing.
This general equilibrium effect leads to larger average debt stocks compared to the
model without financial assistance. Larger debt stocks make a government default
more likely. For our benchmark calibration we find that the general equilibrium effect
outweighs the insurance effect and the default probability is higher in the presence of
the official lending facility.
Figure 2.1: Use of IMF credit relative to GDP of selected countries in financial crises.
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Our model builds on the strand of literature that analyzes the incentives of
governments to default on their debt when bond contracts are unenforceable. Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) show that when default is punished, certain levels of government
debt can be sustainable in equilibrium even when bond contracts are not enforceable.
The government chooses not to default on its debt as long as the costs associated with
a default are higher than the utility gains due to the omitted repayment. Arellano
(2008) studies the quantitative implications of this model by applying it to the
Argentinean default event in 2001 and shows that a calibrated version of the model
is able to replicate important features of the Argentinean data. Multiple equilibria in
models of sovereign default have been analyzed by Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe
(1996, 2000). In the Cole and Kehoe model there exists an interval of debt levels, the
crisis zone, for which the government finds it optimal to default only in case it cannot
issue new debt because of a run on the sovereign debt market.
This chapter is also related to recent work by Boz (2011), Fink and Scholl (2011),
and Roch and Uhlig (2012) who study bailouts in a model of optimal default.3 Boz
(2011) includes bailout loans supplied by a third party (the IMF) along with market
debt held by foreign private investors. She assumes that IMF credits are repaid for
sure and shows that her model is able to reproduce the countercyclical use of IMF
loans while market debt is used procyclically.4 Fink and Scholl (2011) model bailout
loans as a grant that is constantly available to the government and associated with
a restriction on government spending. Their model is able to mimic the empirical
duration and frequency of bailout programs. In contrast to our model, both papers do
not consider self-fulfilling runs on side of the investors and model bailouts differently.
Roch and Uhlig (2012) embed multiple equilibria into an Arellano-type model and
analyze a bailout agency that possesses a sufficient amount of funds to guarantee the
actuarially fair price of the sovereign debt at all times. Considering this theoretical
bailout mechanism, the model illustrates the effect of a bailout agency that can
distinguish between fundamental crisis and runs and eliminates self-fulfilling runs
3Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) briefly discuss an unconditional bailout grant in a sovereign default
model with trend shocks. Benjamin and Wright (2009) analyze the impact of bailout grants in a
model of debt renegotiation.
4Dellas and Niepelt (2011) show in a two-period model that a debt agreement with a lending partner
that possesses a better enforcement technology can be beneficial both for the lending and the
borrowing country, and that the bilateral loans are used more during times of crises than in times
with good economic conditions and low interest rates on the private market.
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completely. Similar to Roch and Uhlig (2012) we allow for runs by investors in an
Arellano-type model. The focus of our model is however different as we model the
official lending facility such that it captures the main characteristics of observed
official lending. One of the key problems of official lenders is to identify whether the
demand for bailout loans derives from a run on sovereign debt markets or from bad
fundamentals. We incorporate this property into our model by the assumption that
the official lending facility always provides financial assistance according to a fixed
price schedule. Furthermore, we model conditionality and seniority associated with
bailout loans.
Bailout loans are also considered in the literature using global games methods.
Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini (2006) develop a three-period model to analyze
bailouts and the implications of the liquidity support on moral hazard. They find
that limited contingent liquidity support can help to prevent liquidity runs by raising
the number of investors willing to lend to the country. Moreover, they identify
circumstances in which official lending actually strengthens a government’s incentive
to implement desirable but costly policies. Morris and Shin (2006) find similar results.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 decribes the benchmark model
used for our analysis. Section 2.3 discusses the calibration of the model and describes
the employed solution method. Section 2.4 presents the results of our quantitative
analysis and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Preferences and endowments
Our analysis is set in a small open economy with an infinite time horizon. The
preferences of the representative household of the small open economy are given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) , (2.2.1)
where ct is consumption in period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and E0 is
the expectation operator. The period utility function u (·) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave and hence implies risk aversion.
The country receives a stochastic stream of endowments which follows a Markov
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process. In each period the benevolent government of the small open economy decides
on the debt policy of the country in order to maximize the discounted sum of the
household’s utility by borrowing or lending on international financial markets. The
government can trade bonds with international investors and has access to a limited
amount of bailout loans. The bailout loans are provided by a supranational official
lending facility which represents an International Financial Institution (IFI) like the
IMF or bilateral agreements with other countries. All loans have a maturity of one
period.5 As long as the government repays all of its debt, the country faces the
following resource constraint:
c = y + qd (d′, h′, y) d′ − d+ qh (h′)h′ − h. (2.2.2)
where y is the country’s endowment income, d denotes the country’s outstanding debt
(i.e. positive values of d imply that the government is indebted), and qd is the price
the government receives for newly issued market bonds (next period’s variables are
indicated by a prime). The variable h denotes the amount of bailout loans borrowed
from the official lending facility and qh is the price of these loans.
In our model we allow for self-fulfilling crises during which a run by the investors
triggers a government default. As we discuss in the next section, a sunspot shock ζ
can be used to determine whether a run by the investors realizes. Similar to Cole and
Kehoe (2000), the timing of actions within each period is assumed to be as follows:
1. The endowment income and the sunspot variable ζ are realized and the states
are d, h, y, ζ and the credit-standing of the government.
2. The government, taking the price schedules qd and qh as given, chooses d′ and
h′.
3. The international investors, taking qd as given, provide d′.
4. The government decides whether or not to default.
5. The government receives financial assistance h′ and households consume.
5One period bonds are also used e.g. by Arellano (2008) and Boz (2011). Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) analyze long term loans with a fixed maturity while
only considering one type of debt.
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2.2.2 International investors
We assume that international investors are acting in perfectly competitive markets.
They can borrow and lend at world financial markets at a risk-free interest rate r and
are risk neutral.6 Given that in a certain period there is no run, the international
investors’ profit maximization implies the following bond price equation, which ensures
zero profits in expectation:
qd (d′, h′, y) = Eζ′,y′|y
[
1− δ (d′, h′, y′, ζ ′)
1 + r
]
. (2.2.3)
The investors price the bond by forming expectations over the sunspot shock ζ ′ and
next period output y′ which, along with the government debt level, influence the
default decision δ (d′, h′, y′, ζ ′). As output is assumed to follow a Markov process,
expectations about next period output are formed conditional on the current output
level. The indicator variable δ denotes the default decision of the government. If the
government either defaults on market debt only or on both types of debt, δ takes a
value of one. If there is no default and the government fulfills all its debt obligations,
δ equals zero. Anticipating the government’s default decision, the investors take into
account the probability of a default for a given choice of d′ and h′ and adjust the bond
price accordingly. The equilibrium interest rate on sovereign debt held by private
international investors hence rises with the risk of a default as the investors demand
a risk premium for compensation.
As we will explain in more detail in Section 2.2.4, there are certain combinations
of the state variables d, h, and y for which self-fulfilling crises become possible. In
this crisis zone there are two possible equilibria: In one equilibrium, the investors
are willing to provide new lending, the government rolls over its debt, and there is
no default. In the other equilibrium, the investors expect the government to default
and hence do not provide new credit for a rollover of the outstanding government
debt and the sovereign defaults. We use the sunspot variable ζ to determine which of
these two equilibria realizes. ζ is assumed to be i.i.d. over time and takes a value of
one with probability pi and a value of zero with probability (1− pi). If the country is
in the crisis zone, a realization of ζ = 1 induces a run by the investors. The investors
6See Lizarazo (2013) for a model of sovereign default with risk averse lenders.
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anticipate the probability of a run-driven default by the government in the next
period which depends on the realization of ζ ′. If there is a run already in the current
period (induced by ζ = 1), the investors are not willing to provide any lending to the
government at a positive bond price. Thus the bond price in the current period is
equal to zero and no longer given by equation (2.2.3).
2.2.3 Official lending facility
As long as the country is in good credit standing, it can make use of financial
assistance from an official lending facility. We assume that the lending facility always
provides financial assistance, independent of whether the country’s demand for bailout
loans derives from a run or high interest rates that are driven by bad fundamentals.
Following Boz (2011), the price of bailout loans qh is not determined by a market
mechanism, but set by the official lending facility according to an exogenously fixed
schedule. Hereby we capture the fact that the lending conditions of the official
lending facility are rather guided by political decisions (which we do not model)
than by pure profit considerations. Consistent with the actual price schedule of IMF
loans, we assume that the price depends on the amount of bailout loans demanded.7
The exogeneity of the bond price for bailout loans makes it necessary to impose a
maximum hmax on the amount of bailout loans. Otherwise a country in good credit
standing could always borrow arbitrarily large amounts before declaring default in
the next period.8 To capture important characteristics of actual official lending we
model bailout loans to be senior to market debt (see Section 2.2.4). Furthermore,
we assume that the official lending facility possesses a better punishment technology
than the private international investors, i.e. the punishment after a default on bailout
loans is stronger than the punishment after a default on market debt only. This
seems plausible as a default on bailout loans might lead to an even stronger loss of
7According to the IMF’s lending policies for the so called ‘stand-by arrangements’, the effective
total interest rate demanded from borrowers consists of a number of different fees and charges
that are added to the riskless interest rate (International Monetary Fund, 2012). Some of the
additional charges are independent of the size of the loans (e.g. there is a 50 basis points service
charge). Other surcharges on the interest rate are increasing with the size of the demanded IMF
loans, as e.g. the ‘surcharge for large loans’ of 200 basis points for loans sizes above 300 percent of
the country’s quota.
8This problem does not exist when the bond price is determined on the private debt market. In this
case, international investors assess the default probability and the bond price falls to zero when
the default probability approaches one.
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reputation. Moreover, the official lenders might use political measures like sanctions,
which are not available to international investors, to punish the defaulting country.
The government can only borrow from the official lending facility if it complies
with conditionality obligations set by the facility. The IMF provides loans to trou-
bled countries conditional on certain policy adjustments. The requirements of this
conditionality are aimed at resolving the balance of payment and government debt
problems of the borrower. They include macroeconomic and structural measures
(Bird, 2007). An additional rationale for imposing conditionality is to alleviate debtor
moral hazard problems (Guitián, 1995). A large part of these measures is related to
fiscal policy and may include amongst others limits on the budget deficits and on the
level of external debt (International Monetary Fund, 2002). We capture important
program features by assuming that a government that is borrowing from the official
lending facility has to follow a debt adjustment program. As long as the government
holds positive amounts of bailout loans, its decision on new debt is bounded by the
following constraint on total new borrowing:
d′ + h′ ≤ λ (d+ h) . (2.2.4)
The parameter λ determines the strictness of the conditionality: For λ above one,
the total debt of the country is still allowed to increase, but at most by (λ− 1)× 100
percent per period. For a λ below one, total debt has to decrease by (1− λ)× 100
percent per period. For the case of a default on market debt we assume λ = 1 which
implies that the country may not increase its amount of bailout loans.
2.2.4 Decision problem of the government
In each period the government decides on its debt policy. The government has
to decide whether to default or not and, in case it does not default on its old debt,
the government has to choose the amount of new debt (market debt and bailout
loans). We assume that the country can either default on market debt only or on
both market debt and bailout loans at the same time. We allow for the former option
because historical evidence shows that countries defaulted on their debt obligations
to private international investors while receiving IMF support (see e.g. Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer, 2006). However, a default on bailout loans without simultaneous
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default on market debt is not allowed as loans from the IMF are de facto senior to
market debt (see Roubini and Setser, 2004).
The government’s choice between the different options depends on the specification
of the respective consequences. As commonly assumed in the literature, default
always occurs on the full amount of outstanding debt.9 After a default, the country
is excluded from financial markets for a limited time and incurs an output cost
l(y) ≥ 0.10 During the exclusion period the country can thus only consume its
endowment net of the output cost: ydeft = yt− l(yt). A country that has defaulted on
its debt only regains access to financial markets with a certain probability. While we
assume the output cost to be the same for both types of default, the average exclusion
length depends on the type of default. A country that defaults on market debt only
is modeled to have a shorter average exclusion length than a country that defaults on
both market debt and bailout loans simultaneously. We therefore distinguish between
the probability to return to financial markets after a default on market debt only,
θ, and the probability to return to financial markets after a default on both types
of debt, θH , with θ ≥ θH . Both probabilities are assumed to be constant over time.
The difference in average exclusion length reflects that the official lending facility has
a stronger commitment to punish a defaulting sovereign than a private creditor.
The value function of being in good credit-standing V o (d, h, y, ζ) depends on the
amount of outstanding debt (market debt and bailout loans), the income state, and
the sunspot variable ζ. It is given by the maximum of the three possible options of
repayment or default:
V o (d, h, y, ζ) = max
{
V c (d, h, y, ζ) , V defD (h, y) , V defDH (y)
}
. (2.2.5)
V c is the value function of repayment of both types of debt. In this case the country
fulfills its contractual obligations, i.e. it pays back its outstanding debt (market debt
and bailout loans), and chooses the optimal level of new market debt and bailout
loans. V defD is the value function of defaulting on market debt only and consequently
continuing without access to private credit markets. V defDH is the value function of
9An exception is Yue (2010), who considers a model of debt renegotiation where the haircut is
determined in a Nash bargaining between debtor and creditor. Other exeptions include Benjamin
and Wright (2009), Bi (2008) and D’Erasmo (2011).
10For a discussion of the empirical evidence see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009).
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defaulting on both market debt and bailout loans and losing access to both types of
borrowing.
For the implementation of self-fulfilling default crises we follow Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2012) by assuming that in case of a default in the current period the
government has to return new loans d′ without any interest payments to the interna-
tional investors. The value function V defD is therefore independent of the amount of
new loans d′. Nevertheless, runs by the international investors as in Cole and Kehoe
(2000) are possible as any international investor would loose interest earnings in case
she provides new loans and the government defaults in the same period.11
The value function associated with a default on market debt only, V defD, is given
by:
V defD (h, y) = max
{h′}
u (ydef + qh (h′)h′ − h) (2.2.6)
+ β
∫
y′
[
θ
[
(1− pi)V o (0, h′, y′, 0) + piV o (0, h′, y′, 1)
]
+ (1− θ)V defD (h′, y′)
]
f (y′, y) dy′

subject to
h′ ≤ h if h > 0
0 ≤ h ≤ hmax.
In this case, the country still fulfills its contractual obligations with the official
lending facility, but has zero market debt as it just defaulted. The value function
V defD is therefore independent of d and the sunspot shock ζ. With probability θ
the country can return to international financial markets in the next period. pi is
the probability that the sunspot variable takes a value of one. f (y′, y) denotes the
transition probability to income state y′ in the next period given income state y in
the current period.
After a default on both types of debt the country has no access to further borrowing
and the households can only consume the endowment. The value function for a
11The detailed within-period timing of actions that leads to the potential emergence of self-fulfilling
crisis is outlined in Section 2.2.1.
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default on both types of debt, V defDH , is given by:
V defDH (y) = u
(
ydef
)
+ β
∫
y′
[
θH
[
(1− pi)V o (0, 0, y′, 0) + piV o (0, 0, y′, 1)
]
(2.2.7)
+ (1− θH)V defDH (y′)
]
f (y′, y) dy′.
The value function of debt repayment, V c, is given by:
V c (d, h, y, ζ) = max
{d′,h′}
u(y + qd (d′, h′, y) d′ − d+ qh (h′)h′ − h) (2.2.8)
+ β
∫
y′
[
(1− pi)V o (d′, h′, y′, 0) + piV o (d′, h′, y′, 1)
]
f (y′, y) dy′

subject to
(d′ + h′) ≤ λ (d+ h) if h > 0
0 ≤ h ≤ hmax.
For certain combinations of the state variables the government prefers to repay its
debt only if it has access to new borrowing but it defaults if it cannot roll over its
maturing debt. In this case self-fulfilling debt runs can emerge due to a coordination
failure among international investors. Given that there is a run by the investors,
the country has no access to new market debt (d′ = 0). To facilitate the following
exposition, we introduce V crun to denote the value function of repayment in case of a
run, i.e. V crun is V c for combinations of the state variables that imply a run. V crun is
given by:
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V crun (d, h, y, 1) = max{h′}
u(y − d+ qh (h′)h′ − h) (2.2.9)
+ β
∫
y′
[
(1− pi)V o (0, h′, y′, 0) + piV o (0, h′, y′, 1)
]
f (y′, y) dy′

subject to
(d′ + h′) ≤ λ (d+ h) if h > 0
0 ≤ h ≤ hmax.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the decision problem of the government. It shows the four
different value functions for an intermediate output level in a situation where the
government has no outstanding bailout loans. The two value functions of repayment
decrease in the level of outstanding debt as the funds repaid to the investors cannot
be consumed by the households.12 For low levels of market debt, both the value
of repayment without a run, V c (d, h, y, 0), and the value of repayment with a run,
V crun (d, h, y, 1), lie above the value of default, which does not depend on the level of
outstanding debt. In this region the government would not default even if there was
a run by the investors. Anticipating this, the investors would not run in the first
place and no self-fulfilling crisis is possible for the given state combination. However,
with increasing levels of outstanding debt the distance between V c (d, h, y, 0) and
V crun (d, h, y, 1) increases and for an interval of intermediate amounts of outstanding
debt V c (d, h, y, 0) lies above V defD (h, y), while V crun (d, h, y, 1) lies below V defD (h, y).
This is the crisis zone where self-fulfilling crises become possible as the government
only prefers to default in case of a run. Rational investors anticipate the behavior of
the government. Consequently, if an individual investor expects the other investors
not to roll over the debt, she will anticipate a government default and will not be
willing to lend to the government either as this would lead to the loss of interest
earnings. Given that the investors are not willing to roll over the debt, the government
12For this illustration, we compute V crun (d, h, y, 1) also for levels of outstanding market debt for
which in equilibrium no run occurs. V c (d, h, y, 0) is always larger or equal to V crun (d, h, y, 1), as a
run restricts the options of the government. Without a run the government could always choose
d′ = 0 and be at least as well off as in the case of a run.
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defaults. However, in case an individual investor expects all other investors to roll
over the debt, she knows that the government will not default and she is also willing
to buy new bonds. Given that the government can roll over its debt, it does not
default in equilibrium. Therefore, there exist combinations of the state variables
for which there are two possible equilibria, one with rollover and no default and
one without rollover and a default by the government. Which of these equilibria is
actually realized is determined by the realization of the sunspot variable ζ. For high
levels of debt not only V crun (d, h, y, 1) but also V c (d, h, y, 0) is lower than the value
of default V defD (h, y). In this case the government defaults for sure, independent of
the rollover decision of the investors.13
Figure 2.2: Values of possible government choices for given levels of market debt
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Value of repayment with run 
Value of default market debt only
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Notes: Values are calculated for a government without outstanding bailout loans and an
intermediate output level. Computations are based on the benchmark calibration outlined in
Section 2.3.
Definition: Given the parameters, the output process, and the price schedule for
bailout loans, the recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined by the set of policy
13The position of V defDH (y) relative to V defD (h, y) depends on the level of outstanding bailout
loans. The government chooses the default option that yields the higher value. The emergence of
the three regions holds independent of which of the two values of default is the higher one.
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functions c, d′, h′, the default decision function of the government, and the bond
price function qd (d′, h′, y) such that:
1. Given the government’s policies, the country’s resource constraint is satisfied.
2. Taking as given the bond price schedule qd (d′, h′, y) and possible runs by the
investors, the government’s policies d′, h′, and its default decision solve the
government’s optimization problem.
3. The bond price qd (d′, h′, y) reflects the default probabilities and ensures zero
profits in expectation for the investors. When there is a self-fulfilling run, the
bond price qd (d′, h′, y) is equal to zero.
2.3 Calibration
We solve the model numerically. Therefore, we need to assume specific functional
forms and assign parameter values. The utility function of the representative household
is a constant relative risk aversion utility function given by:
u (c) = c
1−σ
1− σ . (2.3.1)
The income process is given by an AR(1) process for log (y):
log (yt) = ρ log (yt−1) + ηt (2.3.2)
where ηt ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
. The output costs are modeled as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012) by a non-linear function:
l (y) = max
{
0, l0y + l1y2
}
. (2.3.3)
where l1 ≥ 0. This convex cost function implies that a default is more costly in the
case of a high output realization than in a period with low output.14 The state-
dependence of the output cost function is necessary to generate a sufficient number
of defaults in equilibrium by inducing a strong relation between the default decision
14The convexity of the cost function can also be generated endogenously in a production economy
with working capital loans for foreign intermediate inputs (see Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
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and the output level.15 If a good income state is likely for the next period, bond
prices are high and the country can accumulate high debt stocks on which it defaults
when the output level is low.
In line with the interest rate schedule of the IMF, the price for the bailout loans is
assumed to depend on the borrowed amount. As in Boz (2011) the official lending
facility demands a linearly increasing surcharge ψ (h′) on the risk-free interest rate:
qh(h′) = 11 + r + ψ (h′) , (2.3.4)
where
ψ (h′) = ψmin +
ψmax − ψmin
hmax
h′. (2.3.5)
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency using data for the Argentinean
economy before its sovereign default in 2001. As Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)
point out, from 1993 to 2001 Argentina was at the same time in a currency board
regime pegging the Argentinean Peso to the US Dollar and borrowing via marketable
bonds on international credit markets. This makes this time period especially suitable
for the analysis of the model. The parameter values of our benchmark calibration are
stated in Table 2.1.
The relatively low discount factor β can be interpreted as indicating the strong
impatience of the government of the economy which is mainly concerned about the
short-run. β is set to match the average ratio of market debt to quarterly GDP and
lies in the range of values considered in the literature. To compute Argentinean debt
levels, we use data on external public debt provided in the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance Database. As the series is annual and our model is quarterly
we have to transform the data. At yearly frequency, the average ratio of debt held by
private international investors to GDP in the years from 1993 to 2000 is 16.3 percent
which implies a quarterly value of approximatively 65.2 percent. Following Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2012) we target only 70 percent of this debt-to-GDP ratio as this was
roughly the size of the haircut after the Argentinean default.16 Consequently, only
15Arellano (2008) shows that even without (state-dependent) output costs as in equation (2.3.3)
default incentives are decreasing in the endowment.
16See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) for an estimate of the size of the haircuts in several
default events.
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Table 2.1: Calibration to Argentinean data
Parameter Value Target/Source Value
Discount factor β 0.9005 Debt-to-GDP-ratio 0.456
Risk aversion σ 2 Literature
Autocorrelation log(yt) ρ 0.945 Argentinean data
Std. dev. output shock ση 0.025 Argentinean data
Risk-free rate r 0.01 Literature
Reentry prob. - defD θ 0.125 Avg. exclusion length 2 years
Reentry prob. - defDH θH 0.025 Estimate
Output costs l0 -2.34 Default probability 3.1%
Output costs l1 2.508 Std. dev. interest spread 4.58
Max. of bailout loans hmax 0.25 Observed max. in data 0.2
Debt adjustment λ 1.01 Max. deficit (% of GDP) 1.85
Interest surcharge ψmin 0.00125 IMF service charge 0.5% p.a.
Interest surcharge ψmax 0.113 Mean h/y 0.053
Run prob. in crisis zone pi 0.16 Corr(y, ∆d/y) 0.141
this share of the debt (45.6 percent of quarterly GDP) is considered as the unsecured
and hence defaultable debt stock. The parameter of risk aversion σ is set to 2, which is
a standard value in the literature. The output process is estimated using Argentinean
data from the 20 years before the default event, taken from the dataset by Neumeyer
and Perri (2005). We take the logarithm of deseasonalized quarterly real GDP data
and detrend the series with a linear trend. The risk-free rate is equal to one percent
per quarter, which implies an annual real rate of roughly four percent, a standard
value in the real business cycle literature. The value of the reentry probability after a
default on market debt only, θ, lies in the range of values used in the literature and
is consistent with the estimates of Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), who report
only short periods of exclusion from international financial markets. Specifically, the
median duration of exclusion after a sovereign default in the 1990s was two years.
There is no empirical counterpart for θH as until now there has been no outright
default on IMF credits of an emerging market economy. The value of θH employed in
our calibration implies on average 10 years of exclusion and is an estimate based on
the fact that Argentina still has not fully returned to international financial markets
since its default in 2001, which involved major disagreements between the Argentinean
government and the IMF. In Section 2.4.5 we show that our results are robust against
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considering a higher value of θH , i.e. a shorter average exclusion after a default on
both types of debt. The first parameter of the output cost function, l0, is set to
match the default frequency of 3.1 percent (in annual terms) observed in Argentina.17
The second parameter, l1, is set to match the standard deviation of the interest rate
spread which is 4.58 in the data.18 The values of hmax and λ are consistent with
past IMF programs. We choose a hmax of 25 percent of average output, which is
slightly higher than the largest amount of IMF loans used by Argentina, which was
around 20 percent of pre-crisis output (see Roubini and Setser, 2004). The debt
adjustment of λ = 1.01 is equivalent to a maximum debt increase of 3.9 percent per
year which is approximately equal to an allowed deficit of 1.85 percent of GDP per
year.19 The minimum surcharge, ψmin, is set to 0.00125, which equals a 50 basis
points service charge (annually) demanded by the IMF. The maximum value of the
linearly increasing interest rate surcharge, ψmax, is set to match the mean ratio of
bailout loans to quarterly GDP which is 0.053 for the period from 1970 to 2000.20
The probability of a run in the crisis zone, pi, cannot be observed in the data.
We set the parameter to match the correlation of output with the change in market
debt relative to output, corr(y, ∆d/y). This correlation has a value of 0.141 and is
calculated for the time period 1993-2000, which is not affected by debt restructuring
or default. Defaults that are caused by runs occur both at relatively high and at low
output levels. Increasing pi leads to a rise in the number of run-driven defaults and
thereby decouples the risk of a default and consequently the bond price from the
output level. This yields a decrease in the correlation. In our benchmark calibration
pi is set equal to 0.16.
We solve the model by value function iteration. Starting with a guess for the bond
17To obtain this estimate, we use the default and rescheduling events documented by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), which can be clustered to six default episodes from Argentinean independence in
1816 until 2011.
18The spread is calculated as the difference between the Argentinean interest rates reported by
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and the rate of a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill in the period from
1993Q1-2001Q4.
19See International Monetary Fund (2003) for actual targets of the Argentinean program. Specifically,
allowed deficits for the first two years of the program were 2.3 percent and 1.4 percent of GDP.
One can transform the deficit targets (measured in percent of GDP) into maximum debt increases
by dividing them by the debt-to-GDP level targets for the respective year (which have been 0.477
and 0.473 in 2000 and 2001).
20The mean ratio of IMF loans to GDP in annual data is 0.0132, which implies a quarterly value of
approximatively 0.053.
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price schedule we compute the optimal policies of the government. Given these policies
we compute the probabilities of a default in the next period depending on the choices
of new loans (market debt and bailout loans) and the given output realization. These
probabilities then enter into an update of the bond price function. This procedure is
repeated until convergence. We discretize the state space by approximating the log
output process with the Tauchen algorithm using 31 grid points. The mean of the log
output process is set to zero. For the dimension of market debt we use a grid of 300
points within the interval [-0.1; 1.0] that spans the asset space from ten percent assets
to hundred percent debt relative to a quarterly output of unity. For the dimension of
bailout loans the grid consists of 40 points within the interval [0; 0.25].
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Business cycle statistics
To assess the performance of the model, we simulate the model and compare the
resulting business cycle statistics with the corresponding statistics from Argentinean
data.21 Table 2.2 shows that the results for the benchmark calibration are in line
with the data. Consumption is more volatile than output. All of the correlations have
the correct signs: Consumption and output show a strong co-movement, while the
interest rate spread (on market debt) and the trade balance are both countercyclical.
We target an overall default probability of 3.1 percent. The resulting probability of
a run-driven default is 0.9 percent, which means that more than a quarter of the
defaults is caused by runs. For the benchmark calibration there are no joint defaults
on both market debt and bailout loans. The model nearly matches the number of
periods that the country uses bailout loans. We calibrate our model to match the
average debt stock of Argentina. In accordance with the data, the model implies that
market debt is used procyclically, while the use of bailout loans is countercyclical.
21We simulate the model for one million quarters and exclude default and exclusion periods.
Additionally, similar to Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), we exclude two years after redemption
as the country counterfactually returns to financial markets with zero debt. We calculate the
business cycle statistics over the more than 870,000 remaining episodes.
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Table 2.2: Business cycle statistics
Variable Benchmark model Data
Std. dev. output 6.82 7.68 *
Std. dev. consumption 9.27 8.38 *
Std. dev. interest rate spread 4.56 4.58 **
Std. dev. trade balance 4.47 1.50 **
Corr(output, interest rate spread) -0.41 -0.79 **
Corr(output, trade balance) -0.31 -0.81 **
Corr(output, consumption) 0.88 0.98 *
Corr(interest rate spread, trade balance) 0.61 0.82 **
Default prob. market debt 3.1% 3.1%
→ of which due to runs 0.9% -
Default prob. market debt and fin. assist. 0.0 0.0
Prob(h>0) 0.55 0.60
Average market debt (% of GDP) 45.6 45.6
Average financial assistance (% of GDP) 5.3 5.3
Average spread market debt 3.9 8.15
Corr(y, ∆d/y) 0.141 0.141
Corr(y, ∆h/y) -0.06 -0.15
Notes: Data on output, consumption, interest rates, and trade balance from Neumeyer and
Perri (2005). Spreads are calculated based on the rate of 3-month U.S. Treasury bills (data from
FRED). Data on bailout loans from World Bank and International Financial Statistics (IFS),
market debt from World Bank. Calculations are for 1980Q1-2001Q4 (*) and 1993Q1-2001Q4
(**). Prob(h>0) is calculated for 1946Q1-2011Q4. Debt levels are at quarterly frequency. For
calculation of default probability, debt levels, and spread see Section 2.3. Due to limited data
availability corr(y, ∆d/y) is reported for annual data. corr(y, ∆h/y) and the other correlations
and std. dev. are reported for quarterly data. The average spread on market debt is reported
in annualized terms.
2.4.2 Effects of financial assistance
Given that the model successfully matches the data, we turn to answering our
initial question of how the presence of financial assistance affects the probability of
a government default. We compare the outcome of our benchmark model with the
results obtained by simulating a version of our model that does not feature the official
lending facility. For this comparison we apply the parameter values of the benchmark
calibration in both models. The results summarized in Table 2.3 show that without
the availability of bailout loans the overall default probability is slightly lower than in
the benchmark model (3.0 vs. 3.1 percent). This overall default probability is partly
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caused by run-driven defaults. Without the lending facility there are substantially
more run-driven defaults (1.4 vs. 0.9 percent). We find that the model without the
lending facility exhibits on average a lower total debt level than the benchmark model
(35 vs. 51 percent of quarterly GDP). While, by definition, there are no bailout loans
in the model without the lending facility also the average level of debt borrowed from
private international investors is lower than in the benchmark model. Our results
imply that an official lending facility can in fact help to reduce the probability of runs
by the investors. However, it also substantially decreases the incentive for countries
to limit their debt levels. In total, the probability of default is higher when financial
assistance is available. This results from the fact that the increase in the default
incentives due to higher debt levels outweighs the lower probability of run-driven
defaults.
Table 2.3: Effect of financial assistance on default probability and debt levels
Variable benchmark model model w/o fin. assistance
Default probability market debt 3.13% 2.98%
→ of which due to runs 0.90% 1.41%
Avg. market debt (% of GDP) 45.6 34.9
Avg. fin. assist. (% of GDP) 5.3 -
2.4.3 Model dynamics
Turning to the underlying economic mechanisms of the model, we find that it
preserves several important features of standard sovereign default models. First, the
incentive to default is growing with the amount of debt as higher debt levels increase
the possible gain of not repaying. Second, given a low realization of output repaying
a certain amount of debt leads to lower consumption than repaying the same amount
given a high realization of output. Therefore, default incentives are stronger for low
output states than for high output states. Figure 2.3 depicts the default decision
of a government that has no outstanding financial assistance (left panel) and of a
government that already uses the maximum amount of available financial assistance
(right panel). The black areas indicate combinations of output realizations and market
debt holdings for which the government decides to default on its market debt. The
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government refrains from a default when output is high and debt is low (white area).
The crisis zone (grey area) is located between the two areas in which the government
always or never defaults. Self-fulfilling runs by the investors can only materialize
when the default decision of the government depends on the decision of the investors
to run. For high market debt and low output the government always prefers to
default, independent of a possible run by the investors. Likewise, the government
would always prefer to repay its debt in low debt and high output combinations,
even if there was a run by the investors (which would have the consequence that
the government could not roll over its debt). With rising debt levels and decreasing
output a default becomes more and more attractive for the government. A run by the
investors can then become decisive for whether or not the government defaults. This
leads to the emergence of self-fulfilling expectations by the investors. A comparison
of the left and the right panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates that the crisis and default
zones are larger when the country already uses the maximum amount of financial
assistance. This reflects the fact that the insurance effect of financial assistance is
stronger the more of financial assistance is still available. Moreover, default incentives
are stronger when the country borrows from the official lending facility in addition to
its market debt as it has to pay back a larger total amount of debt.
Figure 2.3: Default decision of the government
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Figure 2.4 compares the default decision of the government in our benchmark
model with the default decision of the government in the model in which no bailout
loans are available. The left panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the default region is
larger in the model without bailout loans. While the black area in the left panel of
Figure 2.4 indicates where the default zones of the two models overlap, the grey area
denotes combinations of output and debt for which the government defaults only in
the model without the official lending facility. The availability of bailout loans also
reduces the size of the crisis zone as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2.4. The
figure shows the crisis zone in the benchmark model for a government that has no
outstanding bailout loans and compares it to the crisis zone in the model without
bailout loans. While for certain state combinations the crisis zone prevails in both
models (black area), the dark grey area to the left of the black area indicates those
state combinations for which self-fulfilling crises occur only in the model without
the official lending facility. For a few state combinations there exists a crisis zone
only in the model with bailout loans (light grey area to the right of the black area).
However, in the model without the official lending facility the government defaults in
this area for sure. The overall reduction in the size of the crisis zone is substantial.
Once the country uses all of the available bailout loans this effect vanishes and the
crisis zones are almost identical in the two model versions (right panel of Figure 2.8
in Appendix 2.A). Both the reduction in the size of the default region and the crisis
region make a default of the government for a given debt level less likely due to the
insurance effect of financial assistance.
As defaults are less likely (for a given debt level) when the official lending facility is
present, the international investors charge lower interest rates than when no financial
assistance is available. Figure 2.5 illustrates the resulting shift in the bond price
schedule. The bond price drops as debt levels increase. The continuous (black) lines
denote the bond price schedule in the benchmark model for a government that has
no outstanding bailout loans, but has them at its disposal. The dashed (blue) lines
denote the schedule for a government in the model without the official lending facility.
The availability of financial assistance shifts the bond price schedule to the right,
resulting in lower interest rates for the government. The effect is present both at
low output levels (left panel) and at high output levels (right panel). Facing a more
favorable interest rate schedule, the government on average borrows a larger amount
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of default zones (left panel) and crisis zones (right panel)
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Notes: black areas: zones overlap, grey areas: default/crisis only when no financial assistance
is available, bright grey area: crisis zone only in the model with financial assistance.
of debt when the official lending facility is present. Figure 2.5 also shows that the
fall of the bond price occurs at lower debt levels when the output realization is low
(left panel in comparison to right panel). Taking into account that default incentives
increase for bad output realizations, investors charge higher interest rates for any
amount of market debt demanded. The interest rate of market debt therefore follows
a countercyclical pattern. The government reacts by demanding less market debt
when output is low and by demanding more market debt when output is high. Hence,
the government borrows procyclically on private bond markets (see also Table 2.2).
The smaller size of the default and crisis zone in the benchmark model stems from
the fact that the government turns to official lending instead of choosing an outright
default. Figure 2.6 shows the demand for financial assistance of a government that has
no outstanding bailout loans. The chosen volume of bailout loans increases for lower
output realizations and for higher levels of outstanding market debt. For very low
output and high market debt the demand for bailout loans is again zero as in this case
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of equilibrium bond price schedules for market debt
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the government prefers to default on market debt without using bailout loans. The
region in which the demand for bailout loans spikes corresponds to the reduction of
the crisis zone in the right panel of Figure 2.4. While the bond price for market debt
falls rapidly when output levels are low (see Figure 2.5), the interest rate schedule
of bailout loans is fixed independent of output levels. The government therefore
substitutes market debt by bailout loans when output realizations are relatively low.
However, due to the additional charges and fees of bailout loans, in good output
states market debt is cheaper and the government demands no bailout loans. As a
consequence the resulting demand for bailout loans is countercyclical.
2.4.4 Welfare
Despite the fact that the presence of the official lending facility is associated with
a higher default probability, the welfare implications of bailout loans are a priori
unclear. Having an additional borrowing opportunity can potentially improve the
country’s welfare. Also, there is a possible welfare gain as the official lending facility
helps to (partly) resolve the inefficiency generated by the coordination failure of
private international investors. The limited commitment of the sovereign and the
presence of incomplete markets might, however, lead to a situation in which the
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Figure 2.6: Choice of financial assistance (for h = 0)
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country is worse off if financial assistance is available. Without the official lending
facility the government has only one defaultable (i.e. state-contingent) bond at its
disposal. Having an additional borrowing opportunity, however, changes the default
incentives and hence influences the endogenous price schedule. The shift of the price
schedule changes the constraints of the optimization problem of the government and
it chooses much higher equilibrium debt levels which are also associated with higher
interest rate payments. To assess the welfare implications numerically, we compare
the certainty equivalent consumption in the benchmark model and in the model
without financial assistance. More precisely, we compute the amount of additional
consumption that is necessary to make households indifferent between living in the
model with financial assistance and without financial assistance.22
As a first step, we conduct a state by state comparison. This comparison is similar
to establishing a new official lending facility in a world without financial assistance.
Figure 2.7 displays the resulting welfare gain (in percent of certainty equivalent
consumption) due to the availability of financial assistance. The country benefits
from the additional borrowing opportunity in case it has no outstanding bailout loans.
22For the welfare comparison we solve for g in the equation g1−σV FA (d, h, y, ζ) = V no FA (d, y, ζ),
where V FA is the country’s value function of being in the benchmark model with financial
assistance and V no FA the value function of being in the model without financial assistance.
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Outstanding bailout loans automatically imply higher total repayment obligations and
therefore have an impact on utility levels. Consequently, the state by state comparison
is only meaningful for a government that currently does not have outstanding bailout
loans. The state-dependent welfare gain depicted in Figure 2.7 ranges from 0.3 percent
to 3.5 percent of certainty equivalent consumption and depends both on the level of
market debt and the output level. The highest welfare gain occurs at high market
debt levels and intermediate output. The regions with high welfare gains correspond
to the reduction in the sizes of the crisis and default zones as illustrated in Figure 2.4.
There is only a small welfare gain in the default zone where the sovereign has no
direct benefit from the shift in the bond price schedule as it defaults despite the
presence of the official lending facility.
Figure 2.7: State-dependent welfare gain from the availability of financial assistance
(for h = 0)
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The state by state comparison, however, does not take into account the general
equilibrium effect of living in a world with financial assistance instead of living in
a world without financial assistance. To account for the general equilibrium effect,
we simulate both models and weigh the state-dependent values with the endogenous
probabilities of being in the according state combination. A comparison of the
resulting values shows that the certainty equivalent consumption in the model with
75
Chapter 2
official lending facility is 0.84 percent lower than in the model without lending facility.
This indicates that the negative effects of the higher default probability and higher
debt service outweigh the benefits associated with financial assistance in terms of
better consumption smoothing and lower borrowing costs. The international investors
are not affected by the presence of the lending facility because they are risk neutral
and always make zero profits in expectation due to perfect competition. There are
no defaults on the bailout loans for the benchmark calibration. Therefore, the official
lending facility does not incur any losses due to its lending activity, but generates
profits by charging the surcharge on the riskless rate.
2.4.5 Robustness
To check the robustness of our results we vary the parameter values that govern
the official lending facility, namely the strictness of the conditionality, λ, and the
probability of returning to international financial markets after a default on financial
assistance, θH . In the first column of Table 2.4 we restate the results of the benchmark
calibration to facilitate comparison. In columns two and three we vary λ, while column
four shows the results of changing θH . Our main result that the probability of default
increases when financial assistance is available is robust against changes in λ and θH .
Furthermore, the reduction of the probability of run-driven defaults and the increase
of the average level of market debt are basically unaffected by the changes in λ or θH .
In the benchmark calibration we use a value of λ = 1.01, which is implied by the
IMF program in Argentina. To evaluate the impact of the strictness we first set λ
equal to one. This is equivalent to a zero deficit target as in this case no further
increase of the total amount of debt is allowed when the country is borrowing from the
official lending facility. Additionally, we allow for a laxer conditionality by changing λ
to 1.06.23 Increasing the strictness of the conditionality to λ = 1 results in a reduction
of the use of bailout loans. There is a decrease in both the average level of financial
assistance and the frequency of the use of financial assistance. As the level of market
debt stays the same, the total debt level of the country slightly decreases. The stricter
conditionality increases the correlation of output with the change in market debt
relative to output, corr(y, ∆d/y). This is because the government cannot increase its
23A value of λ = 1.06 corresponds to a deficit target of more than 12 percent of GDP, analogous to
the calculations for the benchmark calibration in Footnote 19.
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level of market debt when output is low and it is already borrowing from the official
lending facility. Decreasing the strictness of the conditionality to λ = 1.06 has the
opposite effect. The average levels of financial assistance and market debt and the
frequency of the use of financial assistance increase. This results in a slightly higher
probability of default. With laxer conditionality the government still increases its
borrowing from private international investors while using financial assistance. This
causes a slight reduction of the correlation of output with the change in market debt
relative to output. Strict conditionality leads to higher welfare than the benchmark
case and lax conditionality. Lax conditionality results in higher debt levels and a
higher default probability, which is detrimental to the country’s welfare.
For the benchmark calibration we employ a value of θH = 0.025 which corresponds
to an average of ten years of exclusion after a default on financial assistance. To
verify to what extent our results depend on the chosen value of θH , we solve the
model for θH = 0.0625, which implies on average four years of exclusion after
a default on financial assistance. Column four of Table 2.4 shows the resulting
business cycle statistics. While the probability to default on both market debt and
financial assistance is now positive, the overall probability of default remains basically
unaffected. Also, the debt stocks are similar to the benchmark. Our results are
therefore robust to shortening the average exclusion spell after a default on both
types of debt. Defaults on both types of debt, which are present for the higher value
of θH , imply that the government’s total repayment obligations are reduced stronger
than in the case of a default on market debt only. In contrast to the substantial
welfare loss in the benchmark calibration we find that the country actually gains from
having the financial assistance at its disposal when it faces a shorter exclusion. In
comparison to the case of a longer exclusion after a default on both types of debt
welfare is now about one percentage point higher. This comparatively large increase
in welfare is likely to be generated by the fact that the country only defaults on
both types of debt when it finds itself in an especially severe output crisis. Reducing
the punishment for a complete default on both types of debt therefore increases the
country’s utility substantially in these cases. While the defaults on bailout loans
increase the country’s welfare they however also reduce the profits generated by the
official lending facility.24
24For all considered parametrizations the lending facility generates positive profits.
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Table 2.4: Sensitivity of the results
benchmark λ = 1 λ = 1.06 θH = 0.0625
Std. dev. output 6.82 6.82 6.81 6.81
Std. dev. consumption 9.27 9.27 9.30 9.31
Std. dev. interest spread 4.56 4.62 4.58 4.88
Std. dev. trade balance 4.47 4.50 4.48 4.57
Corr(y, interest spread) -0.41 -0.40 -0.42 -0.40
Corr(y, trade balance) -0.31 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30
Corr(y, consumption) 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Corr(interest spread, trade bal.) 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63
Default prob. market debt 3.1% 3.1% 3.2% 3.0%
→ of which due to runs 0.90% 0.89% 0.91% 0.87%
Def. prob. market and fin. assist. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2%
→ of which due to runs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01%
Prob(h>0) 0.55 0.53 0.71 0.54
Avg. market debt (% of GDP) 45.6 45.6 45.7 45.6
Avg. fin. assist. (% of GDP) 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.1
Avg. spread market debt 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9
Corr(y, ∆d/y) 0.141 0.143 0.138 0.142
Corr(y, ∆h/y) -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Welfare gain due to fin. assist. -0.84 % -0.82% -0.87% 0.18%
2.4.6 Comparison to related studies
Comparing our results with related findings in recent quantitative studies we find
important differences. Boz (2011) and Fink and Scholl (2011) also include financial
assistance into a model of sovereign default. However, both studies have a focus
different to ours and do not consider the full set of channels through which financial
assistance affects the probability of default in our model. The presence of an official
lending facility raises average debt stocks of the government in our model. Total
debt of the government increases by 16 percentage points (which is an increase of
50 percent). A rise of equilibrium debt levels is also present in the model by Fink
and Scholl (2011), while Boz (2011) finds the opposite effect. In contrast to our
results both studies find that the inclusion of financial assistance increases the default
probability strongly. In Boz (2011) the number of defaults rises drastically from 5.8
to 64.6 per 10,000 quarters and in Fink and Scholl (2011) the default probability
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increases from 2.88 to 5.00 percent. One important reason for this difference is the
presence of defaults due to self-fulfilling crisis in our model. The official lending
facility is able to decrease the occurence of this type of default substantially. In the
two other models this channel is excluded and the potential impact of bailout loans
is hence restricted. Another reason for the difference might be found in the exact
modeling of the official lending facility. In Boz (2011) the IFI provides unlimited
amounts of non-defaultable loans to the country, which is consequently still able
to smooth consumption relatively effectively after a default on market debt. This
reduces the costs associated with a default relative to a version of the model without
bailout loans. While there might be doubts about the commitment of the IFI to
stop lending to a country in crisis, we think that our modeling choice of restricting
the amounts of official lending is in line with actual policies. Roch and Uhlig (2012)
consider a (basically unlimited) bailout guarantee that completely eliminates runs by
private investors. In a preliminary numerical exercise they find a lower overall default
probability when the guarantee is present. In difference to Roch and Uhlig (2012)
in our model the government holds bailout loans in equilibrium which are senior to
market debt. The associated repayment obligations affect the default incentives of
the government. Considering an endogenous debt structure of both market debt and
bailout loans we find that the presence of financial assistance leads to a slightly higher
default probability in equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
We construct a quantitative model of sovereign default to study the effects of
the availability of financial assistance on the occurrence of defaults. The calibrated
model yields business cycle statistics in line with Argentinean data. Simulating the
benchmark model with financial assistance and a model version without financial
assistance, we find that the presence of the official lending facility increases the
probability of a default of the government on its market debt. At the same time the
model version with this facility displays a higher average debt level than a model
version without bailout loans. The insurance effect of bailout loans, which makes
defaults less likely for a given level of debt, is therefore dominated by the general
equilibrium effect of the resulting lower interest rates. The shift in the bond price
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schedule leads to higher equilibrium debt levels of the government and makes defaults
again more likely. While the official lending facility is successful in reducing the
number of defaults that are caused by runs of the investors it does not reduce the
overall default probability. These results are robust against variations in the strictness
of the conditionality and shortening the average exclusion spell after a default also
on bailout loans. A welfare comparison shows that certainty equivalent consumption
is lower in the model with financial assistance than in the model without financial
assistance. Stricter conditionality leads to a higher welfare than lax conditionality
as it results in lower total debt levels. The presence of financial assistance leads to
an increase in welfare only when the punishment after a default on both types of
debt is sufficiently weak such that the country sometimes chooses to default also on
bailout loans. The recent increase in official lending underscores the importance of
understanding its impact on default incentives and welfare. Our results suggest that,
while financial assistance can help to avoid defaults in the short run, it might entail
substantial unintended consequences in the long run.
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2.A Comparison of crisis zones
Figure 2.8: Comparison of crisis zones
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Notes: black areas: zones overlap, grey areas: crisis only when no financial assistance is
available, bright grey areas: crisis zone only in the model with financial assistance.
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Devaluation and Sovereign Default
3.1 Introduction
Ten years after establishing a currency board in 1991 the Argentinean government
defaulted on its debt in 2001. The establishment of the currency board deprived the
government of the option to devalue its currency to reduce the real debt burden and
might therefore have been an important driver of the default. This chapter sets up a
model to analyze how the possibility to devalue the currency to lower the real debt
burden affects average debt levels and the default probability of borrowing sovereigns.
Pegging the exchange rate can help to reduce inflation rates as it constrains
monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983). When the government borrows abroad in
domestic currency, pegging the exchange rate can also help to lower sovereign spreads
as credibly pegging the currency eliminates devaluation risk. However, a government
that pegs the currency loses the flexibility to reduce the real value of its debt burden
via a devaluation in the case of adverse shocks. Additionally, lower sovereign interest
rates might induce the government to increase its debt, which in turn might raise
default incentives.1
The analysis is conducted in a quantitative model of sovereign default. The
government borrows in domestic currency from foreign investors. This provides the
government with the option to reduce the real value of its debt via a devaluation of
the currency. A devaluation, however, causes a temporary deterioration of the terms
of trade and in this way reduces the consumption possibilities of households. The
1The advantages and disadvantages of pegging the exchange rate have been discussed extensively in
the literature. Pegging the exchange rate can for example help to increase trade by eliminating
currency risk (Alesina and Barro, 2002). The present analysis abstracts from these potential
benefits of pegging the exchange rate to isolate the impact of a fixed exchange rate on debt and
default dynamics.
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government faces a trade-off between using labor taxes or devaluing. A devaluation
relaxes the budget constraint of the government and makes it possible to reduce
labor taxes in comparison to the level of labor taxes that would be necessary without
devaluation. The positive impact of a reduction of labor taxes on labor supply and
output, however, differs depending on the level of productivity. When productivity
is high labor supply is already very high and a reduction of labor taxes increases
labor supply only slightly. At lower levels of productivity a reduction of labor taxes
has a stronger positive impact on labor supply. Therefore, a negative relationship
between the level of productivity and the devaluation incentives of the government
emerges. Simulations of the model show that at low productivity levels the government
optimally chooses an outright default on its debt (and no devaluation), while at
intermediate productivity levels the government devalues to reduce its debt burden
and to lower labor taxes. When productivity is currently high there are no defaults
and devaluation incentives are the smallest. The optimal degree of devaluation also
depends on current debt levels. When debt levels are high the government devalues
stronger to avoid higher labor taxes that would result from servicing its debt without
devaluing.
The model considered for the analysis builds on the standard sovereign default
models by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008). In this framework a
default by the government entails some cost and the government optimally decides
whether to default on its outstanding debt stock. While these two papers consider
endowment economies, the analysis of this chapter is conducted in a production
economy following Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010). It is important to consider
a production economy as the impact of a devaluation affects households to a different
degree depending on the current level of productivity due to the trade-off between
labor taxation and devaluation. In case of an endowment economy this trade-off does
not exist and a devaluation would affect households almost identically independent of
the current level of output. In this case there would be no devaluations in equilibrium.2
The model is calibrated to Argentinean data for the time period before the estab-
2To generate devaluation in equilibrium the devaluation decision needs to depend on current
productivity. In this case the government can build up debt while productivity is high and devalues
when productivity falls. When the government devalues independent of current productivity the
bond price collapses as the government approaches debt levels at which it starts to devalue. In this
case, in equilibrium the government would never choose debt levels which imply a devaluation.
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lishment of the currency board in 1991. To assess the impact of the option to devalue
on average debt levels and the default probability, the benchmark model is compared
with a model version in which the option to devalue is eliminated. Simulations
of the two models show that average debt is higher when the government cannot
devalue. The elimination of the devaluation option, however, also increases the default
probability. This is due to both higher average debt levels and a lower flexibility
when facing sovereign debt crisis as the option to devalue to lower the value of the
debt burden is not existent anymore. The results of this chapter also shed light on
the debate about the ‘original sin’. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) refer to the
‘original sin’ as being the inability to borrow abroad in terms of domestic currency.3
When the government has the option to devalue its debt, sovereign spreads at low
government debt levels are higher due to the devaluation risk. The higher borrowing
costs endogenously reduce government debt levels. The government therefore borrows
on average less from international investors when the debt is denominated in domestic
currency than when the debt is denominated in foreign currency.
Several papers that consider nominal government debt within a model of sovereign
default are based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crises of Cole and Kehoe (2000).
Da-Rocha, Giménez, and Lores (2012) analyze the devaluation decision of a gov-
ernment that borrows in foreign currency and is faced with self-fulfilling runs by
foreign investors. Expectations of a devaluation make households reduce domestic
capital holdings and increase the incentive for the government to devalue. Aguiar,
Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013) provide a continuous time model of nominal
debt to study the impact of inflation credibility on the occurrence of self-fulfilling
crises. The authors model the degree of commitment to low inflation by a utility
cost for inflation and find that an intermediate inflation credibility minimizes the
exposure to rollover risk. This chapter is also related to Araujo, Santos, and Leon
(2013) who extend the model of Cole and Kehoe (2000) to calculate welfare gains from
issuing government debt denominated in domestic instead of foreign currency. The
authors determine in which way the optimal currency regime depends on refinancing
risk and inflation risk. All three papers mentioned above analyze how the option
to inflate affects the default decision of the government when faced with runs by
international investors. The focus of this chapter is different as it investigates how the
3The ‘original sin’ is also sometimes referred to as the inability to borrow long-term domestically.
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option to devalue affects the default probability of the government when it is faced
with fundamental shocks as in Arellano (2008). In contrast to the mentioned papers
which model the cost of a reduction of the real value of the debt burden by inflation
as being exogenous, in this chapter the cost of devaluation is modeled explicitly
via a temporary deterioration of the terms of trade which negatively affects the
consumption possibilities of domestic households. The model endogenously generates
defaults and devaluations in equilibrium.
This chapter is also related to Arellano and Heathcote (2010) who study the impact
of dollarization in a model in which the government faces stochastic output and
taste shocks. A dollarization implies renouncing monetary policy, thereby making
access to international debt markets more valuable which helps to loose borrowing
constraints. A further related study is Röttger (2013) who investigates within a closed
economy model the impact of a possible government default on average inflation rates,
sovereign debt levels and welfare. The author finds that sovereign risk premia reduce
average debt levels. Lower debt levels increase welfare and reduce the incentive to
implement high inflation rates.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the benchmark
model. Section 3.3 discusses the calibration of the model and briefly describes the
employed solution method. Section 3.4 presents the results of the quantitative analysis
and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The analysis is set in a small open economy with an infinite time horizon building
on Cuadra et al. (2010). The government decides on debt issuance, default and
devaluation policies, labor taxes and government spending to maximize the utility of
the households that live in the small open economy. Households consume a domestic
and a foreign tradable good. The government trades bonds denominated in domestic
currency with foreign investors on international financial markets. A devaluation
of the domestic currency causes a temporary deterioration of the terms of trade as
prices are assumed to adjust with a time lag. The deterioration of the terms of trade
makes foreign tradable goods relatively more expensive and reduces the consumption
possibilities of households who trade part of the domestic tradable good for the foreign
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tradable good given the terms of trade. At the same time a devaluation triggers
a higher inflation rate until the end of the period and thereby decreases the debt
burden of the government, providing a second policy instrument next to an outright
default on the outstanding debt.
3.2.1 Households
The preferences of the representative household of the small open economy are
given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cH,t, cF,t, gt, 1− lt) , (3.2.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and E0 is the expectation operator. The
period utility function u (·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in its arguments
and hence implies risk aversion. Private consumption of domestic tradable goods is
denoted by cH,t, while cF,t is private consumption of foreign tradable goods. Public
spending is represented by gt and lt is the amount of time allocated to the production
of domestic tradable goods in period t.
Output is produced with labor input lt according to the production technology
F (lt) and is subject to productivity shocks:
yt = AtF (lt), (3.2.2)
where productivity At follows a Markov process. Given the terms of trade house-
holds optimally decide about consumption of domestic and foreign tradables. Next
to choosing consumption households also decide about labor supply.
The households’ budget constraint is
cH,t +
1
τt(dt)
cF,t = (1− Tt)AtF (lt), (3.2.3)
where Tt is the labor tax and τt are the terms of trade which depend on the
devaluation decision dt of the government. As households derive utility both from
domestic tradable goods, cH,t , and foreign tradable goods, cF,t , they trade part of
the produced domestic tradables in exchange for foreign tradables. Households can
exchange domestic for foreign goods at the rate implied by the terms of trade. From
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the household’s first order conditions, one can derive the following equations for the
optimal levels of consumption of households:
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucH (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )AFl(l), (3.2.4)
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucF (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )AFl(l)τ(d), (3.2.5)
where ul, ucF and ucH denote the marginal utility of labor, consumption of foreign
trdables and consumption of domestic tradables, respectively, and Fl denotes the
marginal product of labor.
3.2.2 Decision problem of the government
In each period the benevolent government of the small open economy maximizes
the discounted sum of the household’s utility by deciding about the following: First,
the government decides about the borrowing of the country. Second, the government
can decide to default or to devalue.4 Last, the government sets labor taxes and
decides about optimal government spending.
Government bonds are denominated in domestic currency and have a maturity
of one period.5 In each period the government optimally decides whether to repay
its debt or to default on its repayment obligations. Next to the default decision the
government can also devalue the country’s currency.6 A default on government bonds
leads to exclusion from international financial markets and entails an exogenous
output cost. A devaluation avoids the cost of an outright default. However, it is
assumed that following a devaluation of the domestic currency domestic prices do
not adjust immediately. Therefore, a nominal devaluation temporarily causes a real
devaluation and the terms of trade temporarily deteriorate to the same extend7:
4To simplify the model it is assumed that the government can devalue the exchange rate but not
revalue it.
5One period bonds are also used e.g. by Arellano (2008) and Da-Rocha et al. (2012). Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2012) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) analyze long term loans with a fixed
maturity.
6The assumption that the government can deliberately choose to devalue can be rationalized by the
observation that in many developing economies there is only limited central bank independence.
7The initial τ0 is assumed to be predetermined and to be equal to 1.
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τt(dt) =
1
1 + dt
, (3.2.6)
where dt is the degree of devaluation chosen by the government. The assumption that
prices adjust with a time lag is in line with empirical observations by Borensztein
and De Gregorio (1999) who show that devaluations usually have a very low initial
pass-through on inflation.8 The deterioration of the terms of trade cause a reduction
of the consumption possibilities of the households. Prices are assumed to adjust
until the end of the period such that a nominal devaluation causes an according
inflation until the end of the period and has no effect on next period’s terms of trade.9
Government debt is denominated in domestic currency and rolled over at the end of
the period after prices have adjusted. A devaluation therefore leads to a reduction of
the real value of outstanding government debt. In equilibrium, both the possibility of
a default on government bonds and the possibility of a devaluation increase sovereign
risk spreads as international investors demand a compensation for the default and
the devaluation risk (see Section 3.2.3).
When the government decides to repay its debt it faces the following budget
constraint in real terms10:
gt = TtAtF (lt) + qt(bt+1, At+1)bt+1 − bt1 + dt , (3.2.7)
where bt denotes real government debt and qt(bt+1, At+1) is the price the government
receives for newly issued government bonds.
The government budget constraint in real terms implies that the government
borrows in units of domestic tradables. Based on Da-Rocha et al. (2012) it is assumed
that there is a technology that transforms foreign tradable goods into domestic
tradable goods. According to the timing of the model the government borrows at
the end of the period when the terms of trade are always 1 which implies that the
technology transforms one unit of the foreign good into one unit of the domestic good
8Da-Rocha et al. (2012) provide evidence for the impact of the Argentinean devaluation at the
beginning of 2002. The authors find that the nominal devaluation led to a real devaluation of
nearly the same extend in the first months after the devaluation.
9Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) show that the impact of a devaluation on inflation increases over
time.
10For the government budget constraint in nominal terms and the relation to the government budget
constraint in real terms see Appendix 3.A.
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at the end of each period.11
The government’s choice between the different options depends on the respective
consequences. As it is commonly assumed in the literature, an outright default always
occurs on the full amount of outstanding debt.12 After a default, the country is
excluded from international financial markets for a limited time and suffers from
lower productivity h(A) ≤ A as long as it is excluded from financial markets.13 A
country that has defaulted on its debt regains access to financial markets with a
constant probability θ.
The value function of being in good credit-standing V o (b, A) depends on the
amount of outstanding debt and the productivity state. It is given by the maximum
of the value of repayment and the value of default:
V o (b, A) = max
{
V c (b, A) , V def (A)
}
, (3.2.8)
with V c being the value function of repayment. In this case the country fulfills its
contractual obligations, i.e. it pays back its outstanding debt, and chooses the optimal
level of new debt. V def is the value function of defaulting on the outstanding debt
and consequently continuing without access to international financial markets. The
government takes into account the optimal response of households when deciding
about taxes, government spending, borrowing, default and devaluation.
The value function of debt repayment, V c, is given by:
V c (b, A) = max
{g,T,b′,d,cH ,cF ,l}
u(cH,t, cF,t, gt, 1− lt)+ β
∫
A′
V o (b′, A′) f (A′, A) dA′
,
(3.2.9)
11There are two reasons why a technology that allows to transform the goods might exist: First,
the small open economy might not be the only producer of the domestically produced tradables.
Second, households trade domestic tradables for foreign tradables in every period such that the
foreign investors have a stock of domestic tradables in every period.
12Exceptions include Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Yue (2010) who consider haircuts in models
of debt renegotiation.
13For a discussion of the empirical evidence see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009).
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subject to
g = TAF (l) + q(b, A)b′ − b1 + d,
cH +
1
τ(d)cF = (1− T )AF (l),
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucH (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )AFl(l),
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucF (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )AFl(l)τ(d),
where f (A′, A) denotes the transition probability to productivity state A′ in the next
period given productivity state A in the current period (next period’s variables are
indicated by a prime).
If the government decides to default, it does not repay its debt and hence relaxes its
budget constraint. However, a default entails a temporary exclusion from international
financial markets and a temporary fall of productivity. The value function associated
with a default on market debt, V def , is given by:
V def (A) = max
{g,T,d,cH ,cF ,l}
u (cH,t, cF,t, gt, 1− lt) (3.2.10)
+ β
∫
A′
[
θV o (0, A′) + (1− θ)V def (A′)
]
f (A′, A) dA′
,
subject to
g = T h(A)F (l),
cH +
1
τ(d)cF = (1− T )h(A)F (l),
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucH (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )h(A)Fl(l),
− ul(cH , cF , g, 1− l)
ucF (cH , cF , g, 1− l)
= (1− T )h(A)Fl(l)τ(d).
In this case the country has zero market debt due to its default. The value function
91
Chapter 3
V def is therefore independent of b. With probability θ the country can return to
international financial markets in the next period.
3.2.3 International investors
International investors act in perfectly competitive markets and can borrow and
lend at world financial markets at a risk-free interest rate r. The investors are assumed
to be risk neutral.14 Profit maximization implies the following bond price equation,
which ensures zero profits in expectation:
qt (bt+1, At) = EAt+1|At
[
1− δ (bt+1, At+1)
(1 + r)(1 + d (bt+1, At+1))
]
. (3.2.11)
The investors price the bond by forming expectations over next period’s productivity
At+1 which, along with the government debt level bt+1, influences the default decision
δ (bt+1, At+1) and the devaluation decision d (bt+1, At+1). As productivity is assumed
to follow a Markov process, expectations about next period’s productivity are formed
conditional on the current productivity. The indicator variable δ denotes the default
decision of the government in the next period. If the government defaults on its
debt, δ takes a value of one. If there is no default, δ equals zero. Similarly, if the
government does not devalue d equals zero. If the government devalues its currency, d
takes a positive value according to the degree of devaluation, i.e. d > 0. Anticipating
the government’s default and devaluation decision, the investors take into account
the probability of a default or devaluation for a given choice of bt+1 and adjust the
bond price accordingly. The equilibrium interest rate on sovereign debt held by
international investors hence rises with the risk of a default and devaluation as the
investors demand a premium for compensation.
Definition: A recursive equilibrium for this small open economy is defined as:
1. a set of policy functions for household’s consumption of domestic tradables cH
and foreign tradables cF and household’s labor supply l,
14For a model of sovereign default with risk averse lenders see Lizarazo (2013).
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2. a set of policy functions for government expenditures g, labor taxes T , issuance
of government debt b, default decisions δ and devaluation decisions d,
3. a bond price function q,
4. a set of value functions V o, V c, V def
such that
a) given the government policies and the bond price function, the household
policies for consumption and labor solve the household problem,
b) given the bond price function and the optimal policies of households, the
value functions V o, V c and V def and the government’s policy functions g,
T , b and the government’s default and devaluation decisions solve (3.2.8),
(3.2.9) and (3.2.10),
c) the equilibrium bond price function q fulfills (3.2.11) such that risk-neutral
international investors earn zero expected profits.
3.3 Calibration
As the model is solved numerically, functional forms and parameter values have to
be chosen. The parameter values are set in line with previous literature or to match
certain moments of the data. The model is calibrated to Argentinean data from
1970 till 1979 as Argentina maintained a flexible exchange rate in this decade and
borrowed from foreign investors.15 While Argentina also had a flexible exchange rate
in the 1980s, two government debt restructurings in 1982 and 1989 and prolonged
renegotiations with foreign creditors between the two defaults were accompanied by
periods of exclusion from international financial markets. The model is calibrated to
the time period before 1980 that is not affected by an unsettled government default.
Before the establishment of the currency board, Argentina faced periods of high
inflation coupled with substantial devaluations of the Argentinean Peso. This makes
this time period especially attractive for the calibration of the model. The parameter
values of the benchmark calibration are stated in Table 3.1.
15Before the establishment of the currency board the majority of Argentinean debt was denominated
in domestic currency (see Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti, 2005).
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The utility function of households is assumed to be of the GHH form:
u(cH , cF , g, 1− l) = γ
(
g1−σ
1− σ
)
+ (1− γ)

(
cφHc
1−φ
F − χ l
1+ψ
1+ψ
)1−σ
1− σ
 . (3.3.1)
GHH preferences help to match business cycle moments in open economy models
and simplify the supply side of the model (Mendoza and Yue, 2012). The coefficient of
relative risk aversion, σ, is set to 2 which is a standard value in the literature. Following
Mendoza (1991) and Fink and Scholl (2011), ψ is assumed to take a value of 0.455,
implying a labor supply elasticity of 1
ψ
= 2.2 which is a value typically used for small
open economy models. The disutility of labor χ is chosen to match the same average
labor supply as in Cuadra et al. (2010) and the weight of government consumption
γ is set to match the average ratio of public spending to private consumption. The
exponent of consumption of foreign tradables 1 − φ is set to match the share of
imported goods and services in the Argentinean economy.16 Following Cuadra et al.
(2010) production is assumed to be linear in labor: F (l) = l.
A default entails an asymmetric output cost that is modeled as in Arellano (2008):
h(A) =
ηE(A) if A > ηE(A)A if A ≤ ηE(A), (3.3.2)
with η ∈ (0, 1). The state-dependence of the output cost function induces a strong
relation between the default decision and the output level. The output costs are
needed to generate a sufficient number of defaults in equilibrium as in this case the
government builds up debt when productivity is high and defaults when productivity
drops. The parameter of the cost of default η is set to match the average default
frequency of the Argentinean economy for the time periods during which Argentina
had a floating exchange rate regime. The calculation of the default probability is
based on data by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001) who
classify the currency regimes of 21 countries for the last century. According to
this classification scheme Argentina had a floating exchange rate regime during 64
years of the century lasting from 1898 till 1997. During the same time, based on
16The data for average public spending and consumption of foreign tradables is taken from the
World Bank’s Global Development Finance Database.
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the default and rescheduling events documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009),
Argentina experienced two default episodes in the 1950s and 1980s yielding an overall
default probability of 3.1%.
Log productivity follows an AR(1) process:
ln(At) = ρ ln(At−1) + t, (3.3.3)
with t ∼ N (0, σ2 ). The parameters of the process for productivity are set as in
Fink and Scholl (2011) to match the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the
Argentinean real GDP series.17
Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source Value
Risk aversion σ 2 Literature
Labor elasticity 1
ψ
2.2 Literature
Disutility of labor χ 0.69 Avg. labor supply 0.71
Weight government cons. γ 0.365 Avg. ratio g/c 15.7%
Weight cons. foreign trad. 1− φ 0.12 Avg. ratio cF/GDP 6.2%
Default cost η 0.97 Default probability 3.1%
Autocorrelation log(yt) ρ 0.85 Argentinean Data
Std. dev. output shock ση 0.0138 Argentinean Data
Discount factor β 0.88 Debt service (% of GDP) 6.8
Risk-free rate r 0.01 Literature
Prob. of reentry θ 0.125 Avg. exclusion length 2 years
The discount factor β is set to match the average ratio of government debt service
to quarterly GDP. As in to the majority of models of sovereign default the discount
factor is relatively low which is often interpreted as reflecting a strong impatience of
the government.
The Argentinean debt service is computed using annual data from the World Bank’s
Global Development Finance Database. One has to transform the annual data as
the model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. At yearly frequency the average debt
service on debt held by private international investors in the years from 1970 to 1979
is 1.7 percent of GDP. This implies a quarterly value of approximatively 6.8 percent.
17Due to limited data availability the productivity process is estimated based on the Argentinean
GDP series for 1993 till 2010. There is no quarterly GDP data for the pre-1980 period.
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The risk-free rate is set to one percent per quarter, which implies an annual real
rate of roughly four percent, a standard value in the real business cycle literature.
The reentry probability after a default, θ, is based on estimates of Gelos, Sahay, and
Sandleris (2011). The authors report short periods of exclusion from international
financial markets after a default. The estimate used for θ in the calibration is
consistent with the median duration of exclusion after a sovereign default in the 1990s
which was two years.
The model is solved by value function iteration following the procedure described in
Appendix 3.B. The log productivity process is discretized with the Tauchen algorithm
using 25 grid points. The mean of the log productivity process is set to zero. For the
dimension of government debt an equally spaced grid of 100 points is used that spans
the asset space from zero debt to 40 percent debt relative to a quarterly output of
unity. For the devaluation the grid spans possible devaluations from zero devaluation
to 320 percent devaluation using 50 grid points.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results of the quantitative analysis of the model. First,
the model is simulated and business cycle statistics are calculated to assess the
performance of the model. Next, the impact of the possibility to devalue is determined
by comparing the benchmark model with the same model without the option to
devalue. In a last step, the dynamics of the model are illustrated by presenting several
policy functions and model simulations.
3.4.1 Business cycle statistics
Table 3.2 shows the business cycle statistics of the model and for comparison also
provides the corresponding statistics from Argentinean data.18 The business cycle
statistics show that the model matches key aspects of the data19: Consumption has a
18The model is simulated 200 times for 1000 quarters. To compare the results of the model with the
data, default and exclusion periods are dropped from the model simulation. Additionally, similar
to Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), two years after redemption are excluded as the country
counterfactually returns to financial markets with zero debt.
19The model performance (with respect to the standard deviations and correlations) is assessed based
on quarterly Argentinean data from Argentina’s Ministry of Economics and Finance (MECON) for
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higher volatility than output and all of the correlations have the correct signs. Public
and private consumption show a strong co-movement with output, while the interest
rate spread, the trade balance and labor taxes are countercyclical. The median
devaluation in periods in which a devaluation occurs is 12 percent and therefore lower
than in the data.20 While there is a high probability of devaluation in the data, the
model delivers only a relatively small probability of devaluation. The reasons for the
low devaluation probability will be discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Table 3.2: Business cycle statistics
Variable Benchmark model Data
Std. dev. output 6.2 4.1*
Std. dev. total private consumption 6.6 4.7*
Std. dev. public consumption 7.8 2.2*
Std. dev. interest rate spread 3.8 8.3*
Std. dev. trade balance 0.9 1.6*
Std. dev. tax 0.6 2.0*
Corr(output, interest rate spread) -0.48 -0.69*
Corr(output, trade balance) -0.65 -0.91*
Corr(output, total private consumption) 0.99 0.98*
Corr(output, public consumption) 0.98 0.59*
Corr(output, tax) -0.62 -0.41*
Default probability 3.1% 3.1%
Prob. of devaluation 1% 38%
Avg. debt service (% of GDP) 6.8 6.8**
Median devaluation (d>0) 12% 23%**
Avg. spread 0.04 0.08*
Avg. gov. spend./total private cons. (in %) 15.7 15.7**
Avg. cons. foreign tradables/output (in %) 10.3 6.2**
Notes: Trade balance in percent of GDP. Spreads are calculated relative to the 3-month
U.S. Treasury bills (data from FRED). Based on data availability calculations are for 1993-2010
(*) and 1970-1979 (**). To calculate the standard deviations and correlations of the variables
the series are detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter applying a smoothing parameter of
1600. Data for the probability of devaluation and the median devaluation are based on Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) and Bordo et al. (2001): From 1898 till 1979 Argentina was in a floating
exchange rate regime for 52 years and devalued by at least 15% in 20 of the 52 years.
1993 till 2010 because for several variables no quarterly data is available for the pre-1993 period.
20The median devaluation is considered rather than the average devaluation as few periods of
hyperinflation strongly influence the average devaluation in the data.
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3.4.2 Effect of devaluation option
To investigate the impact of the possibility to devalue on average debt levels and
the default probability, the benchmark model is compared to a version of the model
without the option to devalue (which corresponds to the case of a country within
a currency union, a country with a currency board or an economy that borrows in
foreign currency). Table 3.3 compares the resulting statistics of both models. The
default probability, the average debt level and the average spread are lower in the
benchmark model than in the model without the devaluation option. A devaluation
provides the government with a second possibility to reduce the real value of its debt
burden. At low government debt levels the resulting equilibrium sovereign interest
rates increase more strongly with government debt in the benchmark model. Higher
spreads induce the government to reduce its average debt holdings, thereby reducing
the average default probability. When the possibility to devalue does not exist, at
low government debt levels sovereign risk spreads (for a given level of debt) are lower
and the government chooses higher average debt levels. Higher debt levels in turn
increase the default probability and average spreads. Additionally, in the benchmark
model the government sometimes prefers to devalue instead of an outright default
which also reduces the default probability. In total, the default probability is 3.1
percent in the benchmark model and increases to 3.5 percent when the government
cannot devalue its debt.
Table 3.3: Impact of devaluation option
Variable Benchmark model Model w/o deval.
Default probability (in %) 3.1 3.5
Avg. debt service (% of GDP) 6.8 7.1
Avg. spread (in %) 3.7 4.2
Avg. cons. of foreign trad. (% of GDP) 10.3 10.4
Notes: As the model features one period debt, the average debt service coincides with the
average debt level.
The simuations show that eliminating the possibility to devalue leads to a higher
average debt service which is in line with Argentinean data where the average debt
service increased after the introduction of the currency board.21 Furthermore the
21The average Argentinean debt service from 1970-1979 was 6.8% of GDP (benchmark calibration)
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increase in the spreads is in line with evidence by Jahjah, Wei, and Yue (2012) who
find higher sovereign bond spreads for countries with less flexible exchange rate
regimes for a sample of 42 developing countries.22 A further result of the model is
that without the option to devalue average levels of consumption of foreign tradables
increase. Foreign tradables become relatively cheaper in the absence of devaluations
as in this case the terms of trade are constant. The increase in consumption of foreign
tradables is in line with Argentinean data as average consumption of imported goods
and services increased from 6.2% to 10.4% after the establishment of the currency
board.23
3.4.3 Model dynamics and model simulation
To provide intuition for the model dynamics several policy functions are examined.
The model preserves important features of standard models of sovereign default.
Figure 3.1 depicts the default and devaluation decision of the government depending
on current debt and productivity. Higher levels of debt make a default more attractive
for the government as the gain from defaulting is increasing with debt levels while the
cost of default is independent of the amount of government debt. Similarly, higher
government debt levels also make a devaluation more attractive for the government.
In line with standard models of sovereign default, the default decision also depends
on current productivity. Repaying a given amount of debt has different consequences
for public and private consumption depending on current productivity. Given low
productivity output is below average and repaying a given amount of debt leads to
lower public and private consumption than when productivity and output are high.
Default incentives are therefore stronger when productivity is low. In line with data
and 11.6% during the time of the currency board. Even when including the 1980s into the
pre-currency-board average the resulting average debt service of 10.3% is still lower than the
average during the time of the currency board.
22As there is no data for Argentinean sovereign bond spreads for the pre-1980 period, there is no
direct way of comparing sovereign bond spreads in Argentina before and after the introduction of
the currency board.
23The increase in the consumption of foreign tradables after the elimination of the option to devalue
is smaller in the model than in the data because the probability of a devaluation in the benchmark
model is small. The impact of a terms of trade deterioration on consumption of foreign tradables
can be assessed by comparing the average consumption of foreign tradables in periods with
devaluation and periods without devaluation in the benchmark model: Consumption of foreign
tradables is 14.7% lower in periods with devaluation.
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from historical default events (see Tomz and Wright, 2007) defaults in the model
occur when output is below average.
At higher debt levels the government prefers to devalue instead of defaulting when
productivity is above average. From the perspective of the government a devaluation
has the advantage that it avoids an exclusion from international financial markets
and the government can continue to borrow in the next periods. The chosen degree
of devaluation depends both on current productivity and current debt levels. A
devaluation causes a temporary deterioration of the terms of trade and in this way
reduces the consumption possibilities of households. Due to this cost the government
does not devalue when debt levels are low. A devaluation relaxes the budget constraint
of the government and thereby allows the government to reduce labor taxes. The
government therefore faces a trade-off between using labor taxes or devaluing.
Figure 3.1: Default and devaluation regions
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Notes: white region: no default and no devaluation, black region: default and no devaluation,
grey region: no default and devaluation (higher degrees of devaluation are marked by darker
grey). The maximum devaluation is 320%.
When debt levels are high the government devalues stronger as this relaxes the
government budget constraint to a larger degree. This allows the government to avoid
higher labor taxes that would result from servicing its debt without devaluing. Next
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to the government debt level, the current level of productivity also determines the
optimal choice of devaluation as the positive impact of a reduction of labor taxes
on labor supply and output differs depending on the level of productivity. When
productivity is high labor supply is already very high and a reduction of labor taxes
increases labor supply only slightly. At lower levels of productivity a reduction of
labor taxes has a stronger positive impact on labor supply. Therefore, a negative
relationship between the level of productivity and the devaluation incentives of the
government emerges.24 To generate a high probability of devaluation a strong relation
between the devaluation decision and the productivity level is needed. In this case
the government can accumulate high levels of debt while productivity is high and
reduce the debt burden with devaluations when productivity falls. For the elasticity
of labor supply chosen in the benchmark calibration the model produces only a weak
relation between the devaluation decision and productivity. This is the main reason
why the devaluation probability in the model simulations reported in Table 3.2 is
lower than in the data.25
Figure 3.2 shows the equilibrium bond price schedule which reflects the default and
devaluation decisions of the government. At low levels of debt the government prefers
to repay instead of devaluing or defaulting. Therefore, the government can borrow at
the riskless rate when debt levels are low, while bond prices fall to zero for high debt
levels at which the government defaults for sure. As the government defaults more
when productivity is low than when productivity is high the equilibrium bond price
is positively correlated with productivity.
The devaluation decision of the government also influences the bond price schedule
in Figure 3.2 as a devaluation corresponds to a partial default from the point of
view of the international investors who hold the bonds. At low productivity, the
government does not devalue and either repays its debt or defaults. This leads to
the strong decline of the bond price with increasing government debt levels. At
24In the case of completely inelastic labor supply, the optimally chosen degree of devaluation is
nearly independent of productivity. In this case in equilibrium no devaluation is possible as the
government always chooses debt levels that are below the level at which a devaluation occurs.
This is due to the fact that foreign investors anticipate the devaluation decision of the government
and demand spreads that are prohibitively high.
25Choosing a higher elasticity of labor supply increases the relation between the devaluation decision
and productivity and results in a higher devaluation probability but comes at the cost of a
counterfactually high variance of labor supply.
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Figure 3.2: Bond price schedule
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high productivity the government first devalues at intermediate debt levels and only
defaults for very high debt levels. This leads to the less pronounced decline of the
bond price with increasing government debt levels.
To demonstrate how the option to devalue affects the default decision of the
government, Figure 3.3 compares the default region from the benchmark model
with the default region from the model without the devaluation option. When the
government has the option to devalue the default region is much smaller than without
this option as the government prefers to devalue when debt levels are high and
productivity is above average (see Figure 3.1).
Although the government defaults less in the benchmark model, the government
uses devaluations to lower its debt at relatively low debt levels. Bond prices therefore
fall at lower debt levels than in the model without the devaluation option. Figure 3.4
shows the resulting bond price schedule for both models for the same productivity
state. In the model without the devaluation option bond prices are higher at low
debt levels due to the absence of devaluation risk. However, as can be seen from
Figure 3.3 the default region is much larger in the model without the devaluation
option. Therefore, at a certain debt level the impact of higher default risk induces
bond prices to fall stronger in the model without the option to devalue. In equilibrium
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of default regions
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Notes: black area: default regions overlap, grey area: default only when no devaluation possible.
the government chooses lower average debt levels in the benchmark model than in the
model without the devaluation option as bond prices fall at lower debt levels. Lower
average debt levels lead to a reduction of the default probability of the government.
Additionally, the option to devalue provides an alternative to an outright default
which also lowers the default probability.
To further illustrate the dynamics of the model, simulations are shown both for the
benchmark model and the model without the option to devalue. Figure 3.5 depicts a
simulation with a sharp drop in TFP leading to a similar fall in output as the one
that occurred in Argentina before the default at the end of 2001. The government
optimally decides to devalue in the benchmark model and to default in the model
without the devaluation possibility.
In both models government debt increases during the first periods while productivity
is high. As the crisis hits, sovereign interest rates increase sharply in the benchmark
model and reach an annualized value of close to twenty percent. The government avoids
a default in the benchmark model by lowering the debt burden with a devaluation and
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of bond price schedules
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Notes: Continuous blue line denotes the bond price schedule in the benchmark model, dashed
red line denotes the bond price schedule in the model without devaluation option. Both bond
price schedules are for the same (above average) productivity state.
a simultaneous increase of the labor tax rate.26 A reduction of both public and private
spending helps to avoid a default. In contrast, when the government does not have the
option to devalue it optimally decides to default. In this case the default first avoids
an increase of labor taxes and a reduction of public and private spending. However,
in the periods after the default the exclusion from international financial markets
and the output punishment lead to lower public and private consumption than in
the benchmark model (in which the default is avoided). This simulation illustrates
how the option to devalue might help to avoid a government default. Without a
devaluation the necessary increase in taxes and decline in public spending can be
prohibitively large and the government prefers to default.
Figure 3.6 depicts a simulation with a less pronounced drop in TFP. In this case
the government again decides to devalue in the benchmark model but does not default
in the model without the option to devalue. As in the first simulation, government
26In the period of the devaluation labor taxes increase by two percentage points from 14 to 16
percent.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation: Devaluation vs. default
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Notes: Horizontal axes denote time in quarters. Default=1 denotes a default, while the degree
of devaluation is measured in percentage points. For the simulated productivity series there is a
devaluation of 12% in the benchmark model and a default in the model without the possibility
to devalue. In the model without devaluation the plot for sovereign interest rates stops after
the default due to the exclusion from international financial markets.
debt increases in both models during the first periods while productivity is high. The
decline in productivity leads to a reduction in output and an increase in sovereign
interest rates. In the benchmark model sovereign interest rates peak at around 15
percent and the government decides to devalue. In the model without the devaluation
option the government faces higher sovereign interest rates as there is a higher
probability of a government default. As the government chooses not to default it has
to cut down on public consumption even stronger than in the benchmark model. A
devaluation can therefore help to smooth public and private consumption when the
government faces adverse shocks.
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Figure 3.6: Simulation: Devaluation vs. no default
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Notes: Horizontal axes denote time in quarters. Default=1 denotes a default while the degree
of devaluation is measured in percentage points. For the simulated productivity series there
is a devaluation of 12% in the benchmark model and no default in the model without the
possibility to devalue.
3.4.4 Comparison to related studies
The results of the model show that a government that does not have the option
to devalue faces a more favorable interest rate schedule at low levels of government
debt. This leads to an increase in average debt levels and the probability of default.
Arellano and Heathcote (2010) provide a complementary explanation for why a less
flexible exchange rate regime can help to increase government debt levels. In their
model a dollarization can help to increase the borrowing constraints of the government
as it makes the access to international financial markets more valuable. While without
dollarization the government can use monetary policy to smooth consumption, the
only way to smooth consumption after dollarization is via international financial
markets. The government therefore defaults less after dollarization and average debt
levels increase.
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While Aguiar et al. (2013) do not conduct a quantitative analysis of their model of
self-fulfilling debt runs, they obtain results comparable to the ones of this chapter: In
their model a strong commitment to low inflation leads to a more favorable interest
rate schedule and higher borrowing. In contrast, weak commitment to low inflation
leads to high inflation and low equilibrium borrowing. Higher commitment to low
inflation corresponds to eliminating the option to devalue in the present model.
Eliminating devaluation risk leads to a more favorable interest rate schedule up to
a certain debt level, similar to the results of Aguiar et al. (2013). However, in the
present model the default region is larger when eliminating the option to devalue
which leads to a less favorable interest rate schedule at high debt levels (in difference
to the results of Aguiar et al., 2013).
3.5 Conclusion
The results of this chapter show how the option to devalue can reduce the default
probability of the government. First, by providing an alternative to an outright default
a devaluation can help to avoid defaults during crisis periods with low productivity
and high interest rates. Second, the possibility to devalue reduces equilibrium debt
levels and thereby reduces default incentives. The option to devalue to lower the
debt burden can also make it more attractive for the government to increase taxes
and to lower public spending to bridge crisis periods without defaulting. In contrast,
without a devaluation the necessary increase in taxes and decline in public spending
can be prohibitively large. In this case, a default that avoids these adjustments can
become the optimal choice of the government.
The analysis of this chapter also sheds some light on the debate about the ‘original
sin’. It is difficult for countries to borrow abroad in domestic currency as the resulting
devaluation incentives lead to a less favorable interest rate schedule. While a currency
board prevents devaluations, the resulting improvement of the interest rate schedule
leads to an increase of average debt levels. The higher equilibrium debt levels, however,
lead to higher sovereign default risk which causes an increase of average sovereign
spreads. This finding is in line with the experience of several southern European
countries that adopted the Euro: Around the time that the introduction of the Euro
was accounced spreads started to fall, while sovereign spreads increased again during
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the financial crisis, presumably due to higher default risk.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Government budget constraint
The government budget constraint in nominal terms is
Ptgt = PtTtAtF (lt) + qt(bt+1, At+1)Bt+1 −Bt, (3.A.1)
with Bt denoting the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds. Dividing by
the price level Pt gives the government budget constraint in real terms:
gt = TtAtF (lt) + qt(bt+1, At+1)bt+1 − bt1 + pit , (3.A.2)
with real government bonds bt = BtPt−1 and inflation given by pit =
Pt
Pt−1
− 1. The
initial P0 is assumed to be predetermined which, together with the fact that Pt is
a function of time, implies that bt can be treated as a state variable. For better
tractability it is assumed that a nominal devaluation leads to an inflation of the
same magnitude until the end of the period when government bonds are rolled over.
Therefore, in equation (3.2.7) real bonds are divided by the degree of devaluation dt
which equals pit in equation (3.A.2). This assumption can be rationalized by the fact
that small open economies typically have a large amount of imported intermediate
goods used for the production of final goods such that a nominal devaluation leads to
a strong increase of domestic prices in the following months (see e.g. Borensztein and
De Gregorio, 1999). Assuming that domestic inflation increases to a smaller extend
than the initial devaluation would decrease the impact of a devaluation on the real
value of government debt.
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3.B Numerical algorithm
The numerical procedure to solve the model is based on Cuadra et al. (2010).
Given the utility and production function one can derive optimal labor supply and
optimal levels of consumption of domestic and foreign tradables from the first order
conditions of the households and the households’ budget constraint. Optimal labor
supply and optimal consumption decisions can be expressed as a function of the tax
rate and the terms of trade that result from the devaluation decision:
l∗ =
[
A(1− T ) 1
χ
φφ (τ(1− φ))(1−φ)
] 1
ψ
(3.B.1)
c∗H = φA(1− T )l∗ (3.B.2)
c∗F = (1− φ)A(1− T )l∗τ (3.B.3)
The expression in (3.B.1) can be inserted in (3.2.7):
g = TA l∗ + q(b′, A′)b′ − b1 + d, (3.B.4)
Starting with an initial guess for the bond price function (q)0 as well as for the
value functions (V o)0, (V c)0 and (V def )0 the following algorithm is used:
1. For every state combination (A, b, b′, d) determine the tax rate (T )0 that maxi-
mizes the utility function (3.3.1)
2. Determine (V o)1, (V c)1, (V def )1 and the default decision given (q)0 and (T )0.
3. Update the price schedule (q)1 and the value functions (V o)1, (V c)1 and (V def )1.
4. Repeat iterating until the value functions and the bond price function converge.
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